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INTRODUCTION
Of all the international treaties pertaining to the protection of
women's rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (Women's Convention)I is the most
comprehensive. The Women's Convention is a brand apart from
1. GA Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979), repyinted at app. II [hereinafter Women's Convention].
2. SeeAnnaJenefsky, Permissibility of Egkpts Peservations to the Convention on the Elimination
of AUForms of Discrimination Against Women, 15 MD.J. INT'L L & TRADE 199,202 (1991) (stating
that Women's Convention, which draws on several international agreements on women's rights,
is culmination of efforts by U.N. Commission on Status of Women, established in 1946); see also
Anne F. Bayefsky, ThePinciple ofEquality orNon-Discrimination in InternationalLaw, 11 HUM. RTS.
Lj. 1, 20 n.100 (1990) (listing 19 international treaties relating to women and sexual
discrimination). Seegeneraly NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS
OF WOMEN (1983) (providing text of 22 international agreements and treaties pertaining to
women). The agreements and treaties in Hevener's book include the: U.N. Charter;
Convention Concerning the Employment of Women on Underground Work in Mines of All
Kinds; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Convention Concerning Night Work of Women
Employed in Industry; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; International Convention for the Suppression of the
Traffic in Women and Children; Convention Concerning Equal Renumeration for Men and
Women Workers for Work of Equal Value; Convention on the Political Rights of Women;
Convention Concerning Maternity Protection; Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women; Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation;
Convention Against Discrimination in Education; Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum
Age for Marriage, and Registration of Marriages; International Covenants on Human Rights:
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and International Covenants on Human Rights:
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
A comparison of the Women's Convention with the above listed treaties shows that the
Women's Convention includes many of the treaties' provisions. &Women's Convention, supra
note 1, arts. 1-16, at 194-96. The Women's Convention was adopted in 1979 and became
effective in September 1981. HEVENER, supra, at 215. Its stated goal is sexual equality. Id, In
pursuit of that goal, the Convention covers virtually all spheres of life: political, social,
economic, educational, legal, and cultural. See generally Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts.
1950
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other treaties because it seeks to regulate not only state, but also
private, nongovernmental action.' More specifically, the Women's
Convention seeks to influence cultural values that may prescribe the
traditional roles of men and women in marriage, family relations,
4
and other situations that are fertile ground for sexual stereotypes
It is precisely this state duty to counter discrimination in private life
that renders the Women's Convention a dynamic, as well as controver-
sial, instrument of human rights.
6
As of February 1994, at least 12 of the 132 States Parties to the
Women's Convention, or countries ratifying the Women's Convention,
were countries with a majority Muslim population." These countries
were: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Mali, Morocco, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.8
Of these countries, all but Mali and Tajikistan registered reservations
to the Convention's provisions.9 Perceived conflicts between various
provisions of the Women's Convention and the Islamic Shaiila l' or
1-16, at 194-96.
S. DonnaJ. Sullivan, Gender Equali and Rdigious Frdom: Toward a Fraurworro Conflid
Resolution, 24 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L & POL 795,799 (1992) (noting that Women's Convention seeks
to eradicate discrimination in social and cultural life, as well as in state action).
4. SeeWomen's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, at 196 (stating that States Parties should
take all steps to eliminate discrimination against women in matters relating to marriage and
family relations, including right to freely choose spouses, divorce, and own, acquire, manage,
administer, enjoy, and dispose of property).
5. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(a), at 195 (requiring that signatories take
measures to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct in order to eliminate practices
steeped in idea that one sex is superior or inferior, or that men and women may be classified
in stereotyped ways).
6. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 799 n.10 (emphasizing that Women's Convention requires that
governments of States Parties eliminate private discrimination and noting particularly Articles
2,5, and 16 which address customary practices and private matters such as marriage and family
relations).
7. Rep-rt of the Commiti on theElimitiafion ofDiscrimination against W1me, U.N. GAOR. 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 38, Annex I, at 154-57, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (1994) [hereinafter CEDAWRpI]r
(listing countries that ratified or acceded to Women's Convention as of February 4, 1994 as
States Parties).
8. Id.
9. AL Many non-Islamic countries have also registered reservations to the Women's
Convention. See id. (listing, for example, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China,
Cuba, Cyprus, El Salvador, England, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland,
Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Thailand, Venezuela, and Viemam as countries making
declarations and reservations); see alto Rebecca J. Cook, Reamvations to the Comnmlion on dx
Elimination ofAllFonms of Discrimination Against Women S0 VA.J. INT'L L. 643, 644 (1990) (noting
that, as of February 1990, 23 States Parties made 88 substantive reservations, making Women's
Convention among most heavily reserved international human rights conventions).
10. See ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, UNITED STATES CONFOPAN'C WrTH THE REQUIRE-
MENIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE EUMNATINON OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, Mar. 1993, at 10, 130-33 (Report prepared by Morrison &
Foerster on behalf of B'nai B'rith Women) (on file with 77 Amediran Unh~iaty Law Reiew)
[hereinafter ALLAPPROPRIATE MEASURES] (documenting declarations and reservations of States
Parties). Bangladesh, Egypt, and Libya took reservation to Article 2 of the Convention. Id. at
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Islamic law,1 was the common denominator of many of the Islamic
countries' reservations.
12
Arguments exist on both sides for the relative leverage of religious
rights and women's rights." This Comment does not make a case
for one over the other, but, rather, examines the necessity for the
reservations in light of Islamic law and experience, and advocates
pursuing the Convention's goals from a culturally specific perspective.
Parts I and II of this Comment provide relevant background on the
Women's Convention and certain family law aspects of the Sharia.
Part III examines the experiences of select Muslim-majority states with
regard to Islamic law and reform as applied therein, giving particular
attention to family law provisions that disproportionately affect
women. Part IV discusses the cultural biases inherent in the Women's
Convention. Finally, Part V makes recommendations on facilitating
a balance between the goals of the Women's Convention and religious
practices.
10. Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia also reserved the right to accede to Article
16 of the Convention, which governs family relations. Id. at 130-38. Bangladesh, Egypt, and Iraq
based their reservations to Article 16 on the Islamic Shari'a, id., as did Morocco, see Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Report of the Secretar -General U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 112, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/48/354 (1993) [hereinafter
Report of the Secretary-General] (documenting reservations of Kingdom of Morocco to Article 16
based on Islamic Shari'a), while Tunisia based its reservation on its Personal Status Code, which
is informed, in large part, by Islamic considerations. See infra Part III.B (describing Tunisian
Code of Personal Status as reforming Islamic law by appealing to Qur'anic reasoning).
11. See KErrH HODKINSON, MUSLIM FAMILY LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 1 (1984) (defining Shari'a
as "divine law ... [or] religious code of conduct of which law in the western sense occupies but
a small part"). The Shar'ia differs from Western codes of law because it is all-encompassing,
making "little distinction between moral, ethical and (in a Western sense) legal questions." Id,
Shari'a prescriptions cover religious matters, such as rituals, praying, and fasting, as well as areas
such as wills and contracts, regarded as secular in the West. See id. It is vital to understand that,
unlike Western legal codes, which are framed in terms of rights, Shari'a principles are expressed
in the form of duties. See id
12. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (attributing reservations of Bangladesh, Egypt,
and Libya to Article 2 of Women's Convention and those of Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco,
and Tunisia to Articles 16 of Convention to Islamic law).
13. See, e.g., Bayefsky, supra note 2, at 20-23 (arguing that race, sex, and religion are
internationally "suspect" categories); Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and
the Convention on Discrimination Against Woen, 85 AM.J. INT'L L 281, 317 (1991) (maintaining
that religious systems have strict views on personal rights and have derogating effect when ted
as bases for reserving right to accede to provisions of treaty); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 816-23
(discussing unresolved nature of conflicts between protected rights and advocating balancing
approach for conflict resolution between gender rights and freedom to practice religion).
Compare with reservations made to the Women's Convention based on the Islamic Shari'a. See
ALL APPROPRIATF MFASURES, supra note 10, at 10, 130-33 (detailing religiously based reservations
of various countries to Articles 2 and 16 of Women's Convention); Report of the Secretary-Genera!,
supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that Morocco's accession to Article 2 of Women's Convention
is circumscribed by Islamic Shari'a, which "strives... to strike a balance between the spouses in
order to preserve the coherence of family life").
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION
The Women's Convention, which was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1979,1 has been described as "[bly far
the most important of the conventions on the status of women,"15
and "the most concise and useful document adopted during the
Decade [for Women]."' 6 It became effective in 1981,17 following
its ratification by twenty countries, the minimum required by Article
27 of the Convention.1
8
A United Nations convention is a document that embodies
commonly held principles and is offered to governments for
action.19  Governments may support a convention in two vrays: by
signing the convention and thereby agreeing not to contravene its
provisions or, more affirmatively, by ratifying or acceding to the
convention and taking specific measures to achieve its provisions."0
A convention becomes an international treaty between or among
those countries ratifying it.2' Thus, the Women's Convention serves
as an international treaty for those countries that have ratified it.
A. Standard of Adheren to the Womens Convention
The standard of adherence to international treaties is announced
in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,2 which is
generally accepted as the authoritative doctrine on treaty interpreta-
tion.' The Vienna Convention states the rule of pacta sunt servanda,
making all treaties binding and requiring that parties to any treaty
14. ARVONNE S. FRASER, THE U.N. DECADE FOR WOMEN: DocttuNfs AND DIALOGUE 123
(1987).
15. HILuA PIEMTLA &JEANNE VICERS, MAING WOMEN MAT1ERL THE ROLE OFTHE UNrrED
NATIONS 123 (1990). See generaly HENEvER, supra note 2 (reproducing numerous human rights
instruments on status of women).
16. FRASER, supra note 14, at 123.
17. PIE-ILA & VIcKERS, supra note 15, at 123.
18. Women's Convention, supra note 1. art. 27, at 197.
19. FRAsER, supra note 14, at 123 (defming convention as "a document containing certain
agreed upon principles which is then submitted to governments for action").
20. FRASER, supra note 14, at 123 (setting out ways in which countries may support
conventions).
21. FRAsER, supra note 14, at 123 (explaining that U.N. convention takes effect as treaty
among countries ratifying or acceding to it).
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opaid for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
23. Se SHABTAI ROSENNE, BREAcH OF TREAIY 4 (1984) (referring to Vienna Convention as
key instrument codifying law of treaties); Cook, supra note 9, at 645 (noting that Vienna
Convention reflects prevailing norms of treaty interpretation and is recognized as such "beyond
its ratifying membership").
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perform in good faith.24 Accordingly, States Parties to the Women's
Convention are bound to carry out its provisions in good faith.
B. Formulation of Reservations
The Vienna Convention does, however, provide for the formulation
of reservations.' The Vienna Convention defines a reservation as "a
unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State,
when signing [or] ratifying ... a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State."26 Under Article 19(a) and (b) of
the Vienna Convention, a country can make reservations to a treaty
at the time of signing or ratifying it so long as the treaty does not
prohibit formulation of reservations or limit types of reservations that
may be made." Mere compliance with these two subsections,
however, does not automatically render a reservation valid. Article
19(c) of the Vienna Convention prohibits reservations incompatible
with a treaty's object and purpose.
28
The Women's Convention does not further restrict or limit the
types of reservations that signing or ratifying States may enter.29 In
fact, it specifically provides for reservations entered against one of its
procedural articles on dispute resolution.' Thus, the Women's
Convention permits reservations consistent with its "object and
purpose."3
24. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
25. See Vienna Convention, supra note 22, arts. 19-23, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-38. Article 19
outlines standards for formulating reservations. lId. art. 19, at 36. Article 20 describes
procedures for acceptance of and objection to reservations. Id. art. 20, at 837. Article 21
explains legal effects of reservations and objections to reservations. Id. art. 21, at 337. Article
22 gives protocol for withdrawing reservations and objections to reservations. Id. art. 22, at 338.
Finally, Article 23 states other procedures for reservations. Id. art. 23, at 338.
26. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 2(1)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333.
27. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 19(a)-(b), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336-37.
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
29. SeeWomen's Convention, supra note 1, art. 28, at 197 (setting out procedures governing
reservations). While the Women's Convention does not specifically state that reservations are
permissible, this fact is implied in Article 28(2), which prohibits reservations incompatible with
the Convention's object and purpose. Id. art. 28(2), at 197. Thus, the Vienna Convention's
"object and purpose" clause has been incorporated into the Women's Convention. SeeVienna
Convention, supra note 22, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337 (stating that reservation incompatible
with object and purpose of treaty may not be entered); Women's Convention, supra note 1, art.
28(2), at 197 (adopting language similar to Vienna Convention's art. 28(2)).
30. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(2), at 198 (allowing reservations to Article
29(1), which governs dispute resolution procedures).
31. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(2), at 197; see also supra note 29 and
accompanying text (noting Women's Convention's adoption ofVienna Convention's "object and
purpose" test for determining permissibility of reservations).
1995] ARE THE SHARI AND THE CONVENTION COMPATIBLE? 1955
In terms of sheer number of reservations, the Women's Convention
has faced an extraordinary amount of opposition.32  Many of the
reservations are substantive. s  Further, the Convention has been
subject to considerable political debate over its alleged cultural and
religious hegemonistic character. 4
C. Articles of the Women's Convention
Part I of the Women's Convention, consisting of Articles 1-6,
defines discrimination against women and outlines the general
obligations that parties to the Convention are required to undertake.
Article I defines discrimination against women as:
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.
The Women's Convention expands on the concepts of "human rights
and fundamental freedoms"' in subsequent Articles.'
Article 2 dictates how States Parties are to enforce the Women's
Convention domestically.3 Included in this Article is the require-
ment that States Parties "adopt appropriate legislative and other
measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
32. See Clark, supra note 13, at 283 (concluding thatWomen's Convention has been subject
to relatively large number of reservations); Cook, supra note 9, at 644 (stating that Women's
Convention is among most heavily reserved of international human rights conventions). Clark
notes that, while 22% of States Parties to the Women's Convention entered reservations, only
3.1% of States Parties to the International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial
Discrimination did the same. Clark, supra note 13, at 283. She points out, however, that a few
other international human rights instruments, most notably, the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have also been subject to
a high number of reservations. Md
33. See Clark, supra note 13, at 282 (stating that, as of December 1989, 41 of 100 States
Parties had entered substantive reservations); Cook, supra note 9, at 64344 (noting large
number of substantive reservations to Women's Convention). Clark states that "[olf the UN
human rights treaties, [the Women's Convention] has attracted the greatest number of
reservations with the potential to modify or exclude most, if not all, of the terms of the treaty.
Clark, supra note 13, at 317.
34. See Clark, supra note 13, at 284, 287 (discussing Islamic and non-Western States'
assertions of Western cultural imperialism and religious insensitivity to religiously and culturally
based reservations entered by some States Parties, particularly those following Shai'a).
35. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, at 194.
36. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, at 194.
37. See gmeraly Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 2-16, at 194-96.
38. See Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 2, at 194-95; sea alsojeneftky, supra note 2,
at 205 (noting that Article 2 prescribes broad range of measures to be undertaken by States
Parties in order to carry out provisions of Women's Convention).
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discrimination against women." 9 In another subsection, Article 2
requires that "all appropriate measures, including legislation" 40 be
taken in order to "modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against
women."41 Article 2 also requires the abolition of all domestic penal
laws discriminating against women.42
Articles 3-5 provide general stipulations on the nature of States
Parties' obligations, such as using affirmative action to achieve defacto
equality between the sexes4" and taking steps to protect matemity.
44
Article 5(a) requires States Parties to take measures to correct social
and cultural practices and other customary beliefs that work to the
detriment of women.4' Article 5(b) impresses upon States Parties
the importance of men and women sharing equally in child rear-
ing.
46
Subsequent parts of the Women's Convention are more specific in
their prescriptions to States Parties. Part II, consisting of Articles 7-9,
deals primarily with discrimination against women in the public
realm,47 particularly with respect to voting rights," running for
office,49 representing their governments," and determining their
own"' and their children's nationality.
52
39. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(b), at 195.
40. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(f), at 195.
41. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(f), at 195.
42. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(g), at 195.
43. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1), at 195 (stating that Women's Convention
will not treat affirmative action as discriminatory).
44. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(2), at 195 (stating that Women's Convention
allows for special measures aimed at protecting maternity and that such measures will not be
labeled as discriminatory).
45. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(a), at 195 (calling for elimination of practices
based on idea of male superiority or stereotypical gender roles).
46. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(b), at 195 (recognizing common
responsibility of men and women in child rearing and development).
47. See generaly Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 7-9, at 195 (enunciating
responsibilities of States Parties with respect to ensuring women equal rights in political and
public life).
48. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(a), at 195 (giving women right to vote in all
elections and public referenda).
49. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(a)-(b), at 195 (establishing women's right to
hold all public offices).
50. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 8, at 195 (giving men and women equal
opportunity to represent their governments internationally as individuals and members of
international organizations).
51. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, at 195 (granting women right to acquire,
change, or retain their nationalities independent of their husbands' nationalities).
52. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 9, at 195 (granting women equal status with
husbands in determining their children's nationalities).
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Part I of the Convention, consisting of Articles 10-14, seeks to
eradicate sexual discrimination in the educational53 and employ-
mentPI contexts, and calls for adequate health care for women.0
In addition, this Part addresses the special needs of rural women5 5
Article 10 of the Convention calls for States Parties to take appropri-
ate measures to ensure that women and men have equal academis'
and extracurricular opportunities s free of sexual stereotyping, at all
levels of education. The Article considers coeducation as a means of
eliminating sexual stereotyping in educational settings.5 9
Part IV of the Convention, consisting of Articles 15 and 16, deals
with the rights of women under the lavw° and within the family.61
Article 15 requires that women be given status equal with men under
the law2 and equal legal capacity in civil matters, such as the
administration of property or court proceedings.' The Article
enjoins States Parties from giving legal effect to contracts and other
instruments that restrict the legal capacity of women.' Finally,
Article 15 requires that women have rights equal to men when
choosing their residences and domiciles.1
53. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 10, at 195 (giving women equal access to
educational opportunities, including gender-neutral career and vocational guidance, scholarships
and grants, and continuing education programs).
54. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 11, at 195 (stating that women should have
right to, among other things, employment in any profession, equal pay and benefits, social
security, safe working conditions, and freedom from sanctions or dismsml for pregnancy,
maternity leave, or marital status).
55. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 12, at 196 (requiring States Parties to ensure
thatwomen have same access to general medical care as men, and make special efforts to ensure
women's access to obstetric, gynecological, and other gender-related medical care).
56. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 14, at 196 (requiring generally that States
Parties ensure that women participate in and benefit from rural development, and requiring,
in particular, assistance of States Parties in helping rural women to obtain formal and informal
training and education, access agricultural credit and loans, and procure adequate housing).
57. See supra note 53 (listing academic rights Article 10 provides for women).
58. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 10(g), at 195 (requiring equal opportunities
for women to actively participate in sports and physical education).
59. See Women's Convention, supranote 1, art. 10(c), at 195 (listing coeducation, textbook
and curricular revisions, and new teaching methods as methods of eliminating sexual
stereotyping in educational institutions).
60. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 15, at 196 (stating that States Parties shall treat
women and men equally under law by giving women legal capacity equal to that of men in civil
and contractual matters, prohibiting contracts that restrict women's legal capacity, and alloving
women to administer property, choose residence and domicile, and move at will).
61. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, at 196 (securing equal rights for women in
marriage and family matters, including rights to enter into marriage freely, work outside
household, and participate in family planning).
62. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(1), at 196.
63. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(2), at 196.
64. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(3), at 196.
65. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 15(4), at 196.
1958 THE AMERICAN UN1ERSrry LAW REvIEW [Vol. 44:1949
Article 16 requires States Parties to eliminate discrimination against
women "in all matters relating to marriage and family relations." '
It requires, among other things, that men and women should be
equally free to choose a spouse and enter into marriage, 7 have
equal fights during marriage and divorce,' have equal rights vis-a-vis
their children,69 and equal rights to acquire, own, enjoy, and dispose
of property.7" Finally, the Article nullifies child marriages, requires
that States Parties set a minimum age for marriage, and mandates
official registration of marriages.71
Part V of the Convention, consisting of Articles 17-22, deals with
international monitoring of States Parties' adherence to the Women's
Convention.72 Article 17 establishes a Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) consisting of a diverse
group of twenty-three experts in the field of global women's rights.
75
This Committee oversees the progress of States Parties in achieving
compliance with the Convention74 by reviewing periodic country
reports submitted by States Parties on measures taken to effectuate
the Convention.75  States Parties nominate 76 and elect77 committee
members, who rotate every four years.78  Articles 19 through 22
cover the Committee's modus operandi and other technical matters.
79
66. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, at 196. Article 16, like Article 2, has faced
a number of reservations based on religious grounds and is considered controversial with respect
to practicability under Islamic Shari'a regimes. See Cook, supra note 9, at 687-88, 702-03
(documenting reservations of Islamic countries to Articles 2 and 16); supra notes 10, 12 and
accompanying text (discussing several countries' reservations to Article 16 based upon Islamic
considerations).
67. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1)(a)-(b), at 196 (giving women right to
choose own spouse and disallowing marriage without woman's "free and full consent").
68. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1)(c), at 196.
69. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1) (d)-(f), at 196 (giving women full parental
rights and responsibilities, regardless of marital status, including right to decide number and
spacing of children, and to act as children's guardian, trustee, or ward).
70. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1)(h), at 196.
71. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(2), at 196 (requiring States Parties to take
"all necessary action, including legislation" to meet these goals).
72. See generally Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 17-22, at 196-97 (providing for
establishment of"Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women" (CEDAW)
to oversee implementation of Women's Convention).
73. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, at 196-97.
74. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 17, at 196-97.
75. Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 18, 20, at 197 (describing procedures for
oversight committee).
76. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 17(2)-(3), at 196-97 (outlining procedure by
which each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals).
77. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 17(2)-(4), (6), at 196-97 (outlining procedures
for secret ballot elections).
78. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 17(5), at 197.
79. See generally Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 19-22, at 197 (establishing rules
governing Committee's meeting and activities).
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The Committee's power, as outlined in Article 21, lies in its freedom
to make suggestions and recommendations to the United Nations
General Assembly.'0
The final part of the Convention, Part VI, consists of Articles
23-30.8 Article 23 allows States Parties to substitute domestic or
international laws that are more conducive to gender equality for
measures offered by the Convention that are less effective.' Article
26 states that written requests to revise the Convention may be sent
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations at any timef3
Proposed revisions are then taken up by the General AssemblyY'
Article 28 addresses reservations.' It states, along the lines of the
Vienna Convention,8 6 that reservations that are inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention are impermissibleP It also
states that reservations may be withdrawn at any time, subject to
notification to the Secretary-General.
D. Reservations Entered to the Convention on the Basis of Islamic Law
Among the Islamic countries registering reservations to articles of
the Women's Convention are Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. 9 All
three countries have registered reservations to Article 16 of the
Convention that are essentially based on the Islamic Shari'a.Y Ith
80. S&Women's Convention, supmnote 1, art. 21, at 197 (permitting Committee to make
suggestions and recommendations to U.N. General Assembly based upon Committee's activities
and States Parties' suggestions and reports).
81. Women's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 28-50, at 197-98.
82. &elWomen's Convention, supra note 1, art. 23, at 197 (stating thatWomen's Convention
shall not override legislation, international treaties, conventions, or agreements that are more
conducive to achievement of gender equality).
83. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 26(1), at 197.
84. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 26(2), at 197 (stating that General Asembly
shall decide steps, if any, to take upon State Party request for Women's Convention revision).
85. SeegenerayWomen's Convention, supra note 1, art. 28, at 197 (prescribing procedures
for accepting, circulating, and withdrawing reservations).
86. See supra text accompanying note 28 (noting that Vienna Convention stipulates that
reservations may not contravene object and purpose of treaties).
87. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(2), at 197.
88. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(3), at 197 (stating that reservations and
subsequent withdrawals addressed to U.N. Secretary General are effective upon receipt).
89. See CEDAWRepor supra note 7, at 154-57 (listing Egypt. Tunisia, and Morocco among
States Parties to Women's Convention declaring reservations as of February 4, 1994).
90. &eesupranote 10 (discussing reservations of various countries, includingEgypt, Tunisia,
and Morocco, to Articles 2 and 16 of Women's Convention); s&- also Clark, supra note 13, at
299-301 (mentioning Egypt's reservation to Article 2 and Tunisia's reservations regarding
"aspects of matrimonial property and family law," as outlined in Article 16, and stating that both
have uncertain scope); Cook, supranote 9, at687-88, 696-97 (outliningreservations of Egyptand
Tunisia, among others, to Article 2, and Egypt to Article 16). SeegnwntJenesky, supra note
2, at 205-06 (discussing Egypt's reservations to Articles 2 and 16 of Women's Convention and
assessing permissibility of each).
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regard to Article 2, both Egypt and Morocco have reserved the right
to accede or have declared an intention not to do anything to
abrogate the Islamic Shari'a.91 Tunisia filed a "general declaration"
stating that it will not adopt measures that conflict with Chapter I of
the Tunisian Constitution, which declares Islam the official religion
of Tunisia.
9 2
The text of the Egyptian reservation to Article 16 states, in part,
that provisions of Article 16 that mandate equal rights for women in
the realms of marriage and family relations9"
be without prejudice to the Islamic Sharia provisions whereby
women are accorded rights equivalent to those of their spouses so
as to ensure ajust balance between them. This is out of respect for
the sanctity deriving from firm religious beliefs which govern
marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question
and in view of the fact that one of the most important bases of
these relations is an equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure
complementarity which guarantees true equality between the
spouses and not quasi-equality that renders the marriage a burden
on the wife. This is because the provisions of the Islamic Sharia lay
down that the husband shall pay bridal money to the wife and
maintain her fully out of his own funds and shall also make a
payment to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains full rights
over her property and is not obliged to spend anything on her
keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife's rights to divorce by
While little has been written on Morocco's reservations to Articles 2 and 16, it is important
to point out that Morocco's accession to the Women's Convention was made relatively recently,
onJune 21,1993. See CEDA WReport, supra note 7, at 155; Report of the Secretary-Genera4 supra note
10, at 8-9 (containing text of Morocco's reservations to Articles 2 and 16 and noting that Article
2 reservation is termed "declaration"). Morocco states that the provisions ofArticle 2 must "not
conflict with the provisions of the Islamic Shariah." Id. at 8. This reservation also notes that
.certain of the provisions contained in the Moroccan Code of Personal Status according women
rights that differ from the rights conferred on men may not be infringed upon or abrogated
because they derive primarily from the Islamic Shariah." Id. The same document contains
Morocco's reservation to Article 16, which states that:
Equality [of the kind requiring equality of men and women in matters of entry Into
and dissolution of marriage] is considered incompatible with the Islamic Shaiah,
which guarantees to each of the spouses the rights and responsibilities within a
framework of equilibrium and complementarity in order to preserve the sacred bond
of matrimony. ... For these reasons, the Islamic Shariah confers [] the right of
divorce on a woman only by decision of a Shariah judge.
Id at 9.
91. SeeALL APPROPRIATE MEAsuREs, supra note 10, at 10 (reproducing Egypt's reservation
to Article 2, which states that Egypt will comply with Article only if compliance does not violate
Islamic Shadi'a); Report of the Secretary-General supra note 10, at 8 (outlining Morocco's declaration
that its commitment to Article 2 is circumscribed by Shari'a).
92. Cook, supra note 9, at 687.
93. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, at 196.
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making it contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas no such
restriction is laid down in the case of the husband."
This reservation is similar to Morocco's reservation, which also
emphasizes the concept of complementarity of the spouses and
discusses a wife's right to own and dispose of her own property; and
receive payment upon marriage and divorce from her husband."
Tunisia's reservation to Article 16(c), (d), (f), (g), and (h) is based
on the Tunisian domestic law without much elaboration." The
Egyptian and Moroccan reservations are innovative in terms of
marshaling a "separate but equal" argument and portraying the
Islamic concept of women's equality in terms of complementary
rights." Framing women's and men's roles as different but "of equal
value may be claimed to satisfy the Women's Convention."' Thus,
the case can be made that a reservation, such as Egypt's, "'according
women rights equivalent to the rights of their spouses so as to ensure
a just balance between them,'" may be compatible with a literalist
interpretation of Article 16 of the Women's Convention.99 It is,
however, questionable whether Article 23, which allows States Parties
to use domestic laws that are more conducive to achieving gender
equality' ° permits the "equivalency" approach relied upon by Egypt
and Morocco' in light of the "object and purpose" test set out in
both the Women's1" and Vienna Conventions.3 The "object and
purpose" argument can be utilized considering that "[a] fundamental
object and purpose of the Women's Convention is that states parties
eliminate [gender-specific] family laws"1"' that may be equitably
94. Cook, supra note 9, at 704 (citing U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/13/Rev. 1. at 11 (1989)).
95. Repot of the Serrzagera, supra note 10, at 8.
96. ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 133 (asserting merely that certain
provisions of Article 16 "must not conflict with [the equivalent] provisions of the Peronal Status
Code").
97. Cook, supra note 9, at 704 (stating that marital relations in Egpt are governed by
Islamic religious beliefs, which may not be questioned, and arguing that equal but distinct
responsibilities given husband and wife in Islam make adherence to Article 16 unfeasible).
98. Cook, supra note 9, at 704.
99. Cook, supra note 9, at 704 (citations omitted).
100. SeeWomen's Convention, supra note 1, art. 23, at 197 (stating that Convention shall not
affect legislation, international conventions, treaties, or agreements more conducive to achieving
gender equality).
101. Se supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (explaining that Egypt and Morocco
subscribe to complementarity of male and female roles approach, which is, according to them,
rationale underlying Shal'a's concept of rights of men and women).
102. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(2), at 197.
103. Vienna Convention, sup-a note 22, art. 19(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
104. Cook, supra note 9, at 705-06.
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valued in theory but inequitably regarded in practice, thereby
compromising women's status.'05
Commentators have considered reservations to Article 2 to breach
the object and purpose test of the Vienna Convention."'6 Reserva-
tions based on domestic provisions contravene the generally accepted
norm that domestic law cannot be used as a justification to refuse
compliance with international treaty provisions.
107
Both the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women and the recently issued Vienna Declaration on Human
Rights108 state that the object of achieving full compliance with
human rights instruments is undermined by the existence of
reservations and that, to the extent possible, such reservations should
be withdrawn, or at the very least, narrowly formulated. °9 Insofar
as any of the registered reservations are based on the Shari'a, it must
be emphasized that expressions of religious faith are protected by
international human rights law.110 The authenticity of religious
expressions is not at issue in international instruments protecting
freedom of religion, and, authentic or not, practices believed to be
105. Cook, supra note 9, at 704-05. But see Bayefsky, supra note 2, at 34 (maintaining that
equality does not always mean equal treatment, nor are differences in treatment always
tantamount to discrimination).
106. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 13, at 299 (stating that "very object and purpose [of tie
Women's Convention] is set out in Article 2" and arguing that if reservation to Article 2 is put
into practice, discrimination against women would inevitably result, thereby contravening object
and purpose of Women's Convention); Cook, supra note 9, at 689 (stating thatArdtcle 2 sets out
goals of Women's Convention and delineates means by which Convention's provisions are to be
carried out and therefore facilitates its object and purpose); Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 211
(maintaining that Article 2 is central to carrying out object and purpose of Women's Convention
and quoting commentator as saying that reservation to Article 2 "'obstructs and compromises
compliance with the object and purpose of the Convention'") (citations omitted).
107. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 (prohibiting States
Parties from invoking their internal law as justification for failure to honor treaty provisions).
108. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/24 (Part I) (1993), 20-446, rprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993)
(hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
109. See CEDAWReport, supra note 7, at 12-13 (referring to "problem of reservations" and
recommending that States Parties formulate reservations narrowly with objective of eventually
withdrawing them); Vienna Declaration, supra note 108, at 32, 21 I.LM. part II, (A) (5)
(articulating general principle that States Parties should limit extent of reservations lodged to
human rights treaties and formulate any reservations narrowly, respecting object and purpose
of treaty, with view toward withdrawing them). The Vienna Declaration also specifically
addresses the Women's Convention and urges the application of its general principles on
reservations to the Women's Convention. Id. at 37, 21 LLM. part II, (B) (3) (39).
110. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 18, 999
U.N.T.S. 178, 178 [hereinafter Political Covenant] (guaranteeing freedom to manifest religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching); Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res.
36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) (hereinafter
Declaration on Religious Intolerance] (stating that religious beliefs should be respected as
fundamental element of life).
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expressions of religion are protected."' It is a recognized principle,
however, that freedom of religion is circumscribed by restrictions that
are "prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others.""' Religion may not be used as a justification for the
derogation of rights that are universally recognized and upheld." 3
Further, as noted earlier, the Vienna Convention provides that
domestic law cannot be invoked to escape compliance with provisions
of a treaty."4 Moreover, "traditional outlooks or local prejudice will
not count as reasonable justification for differential treatment."" 5
Thus, freedom of religion, while guaranteed,"' is not an absolute
defense to the derogation of certain other rights." 7  Despite such
international standards governing freedom of religion vis-.-vis other
rights, provisions of religious systems may themselves be utilized to
bridge apparent gaps between religious practice and other protected
rights. Thus, religious dictates need not be framed in terms antago-
nistic to other human rights and may lend support to instruments of
human rights. For example, the experiences of some countries
entering Sharia-based reservations reveal that the reservations may be
unnecessary according to the Slari'a itself, or that the reservations
could be formulated more narrowly,"8 in compliance with the
111. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 813 (maintaining that whether practice is considered aberrant
or authoritative is irrelevant to applicability of religious freedom so long as such practices are
not representative of "spurious or fraudulent claims"). Professor Sullivan notes in her article
that, while the question of authenticity of a particular religious practice is not considered by
human rights instruments protecting freedom of religion, revealing a practice's authenticity
"does... have both strategic and substantive importance for those seeking to reform religious
law or practice or to promote alternative interpretations in that inauthentic and undesirable
practices may be exposed as such so that they may be reformed. rd.
112. Political Covenant, supra note 110, art. 18(3), 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; sw Declaration on
Religious Intolerance, sup-a note 110, at 171 (utilizing similar language).
113. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 811 (describing religiously permitted practices such as
slavery, apartheid, untouhability, and withholding medical treatment from children that are
nonetheless condemned internationally).
114. Vienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 27,1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 (banning parties from
invoking their internal law as justification for failure to perform treaty obligations); se Sullivan,
supra note 3, at 807 (asserting that while "states may implement religious law in domestic law,
they may not invoke religious law embodied in national legal systems to excuse breaches of their
international human rights obligations"); sup a note 107 and accompan)ing text.
115. Bayefsky, supra note 2, at 34 (articulating internationally recognized standards of
nondiscrimination).
116. See Political Covenant, supra note 110, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178; Declaration on Religious
Intolerance, supra note 110, at 171.
117. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (maintaining that freedom of religion is
not absolute, as in case where such right may be suspended in order to protect greater good or
where States Parties attempt to bypass compliance with international treaties by pointing to
religiously imbued provisions of domestic law).
118. See infra Part V (demonstrating that reservations expressed by countries such as Tunisia
and Iraq to Article 16 are overbroad).
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international recommendation to formulate reservations as narrowly
as possible, and still remain consistent with the Shari'a.n 9  The
following section illustrates the dynamic nature of the Shari'a and
highlights the fact that Qur'anic sources of Shari'a were instrumental
in according women a measure of rights where previously they had
none.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SHARI'A
The Shari'a is not a singular law, but rather is derived from many
sources.1 20  Different and often conflicting laws make up the totality
of what is collectively known as the Shari'a.1'2 A major feature of
the Shari'a is that it draws no distinction between the religious and the
secular, between legal, ethical, and moral questions, or between the
public and private aspects of a Muslim's life.122 This last subfeature
particularly is central to understanding the differences between law in
the Western sense and law in the Islamic sense.12 The Shari'a thus
regulates matters ranging from prayer and dietary regulations to wills
and contracts. 124 The Shari'a is considered to be a divine law, the
authority of which depends on the revealed word of Allah, or
God." Since its revelation and compilation, the Shari'a has been
expounded and interpreted by Islamic jurists 6 As divine law, the
Shari'a is considered to be a set of duties by which all Muslims must
live and conduct themselves.12
119. See .supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations made by
CEDAWand Vienna Declaration to limit reservations).
120. SeeJOHN L. EsPosrro, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 3-10 (1982) (identifying and
elaborating on four main sources of Islamic law: the Qur'an, Sunna (or Prophetic example),
qyas (analogical reasoning), and Yjma (community consensus)).
121. See iU at 35 (documenting differences in divorce law among four major school. of
Islam, namely, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Hanafi). Various Islamic laws also differ In terms
of maintenance to be paid to a divorced wife, see id. at 27, views on equality within marriage, see
iU. at 128, certain inheritance rights, see id. at 69, and sources of consensus (or #ima), sce id. at
128, among other differences.
122. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 1.
123. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 1 (contrasting Shafi'a and Western legal systems and
noting that private and public matters were separated under Roman law). &e infra Part lI.C
(discussing and differentiating between private and public law aspects of Shari'a). The all-
inclusive nature of the Shari'a explains why it may conflict with the Women's Convention, which
is also all-inclusive in terms of the areas it seeks to regulate. See supra notes 2-6 and
accompanying text (characterizing Women's Convention as seeking to change discriminatory
practices in social, cultural, and familial realms as well as in public realm).
124. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 1.
125. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that force of Shari'a law is regulated by Its divine
nature rather than by sanctions that may be imposed).
126. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 1.
127. See HODKINSON, supra note 11, at I (terming Shari'a to be "path of the believer, the way
which Allah wishes man to pass").
1964
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A. Sources of the Shari'a
There are four main sources of Sharia.'l These are the Qur'an,
Sunna, qiyas, and ijma.1' The Qur'an is the primary source of
Shari'a, and is considered, as God's revelation, "the central fact of the
Islamic religious experience. " " The precepts of Shari'a are gar-
nered first from the Qur'an, second from the traditions of the
Prophet (Sunna), and finally "from the 'reliable' and 'guided' action
of the individual persons and the community who have lived in
accordance with that revelation and tradition."' While qiyOas
(reasoning by analogy) and qjma (consensus) are not expressly
sanctioned sources of law, they came about as a result of ijtihad, or
interpretation, which was considered to be an authentic way to derive
the Shari'a.
132
1. The Qur'an as a source of Shari'a
The Qur'an, the sacred book of the Muslims, is the compilation of
revelations made by Allah (God) to Prophet Muhammad from
approximately A.D. 610 to A.D. 632, the time of the Prophet's
death. " The Qur'an is the basis of the "Islamic code of conduct
both towards Allah and to one's fellow man."" It is comprised of
chapters, known as suras, which are subdivided into verses." The
Qur'an issues prescriptions on all realms of life, making "no distinc-
tion between matters which the Christian would categorize as
religious, moral, social and legal.""s  While the Qur'an is the
primary source of Islamic law, it cannot be equated with a code of law
as such.'37 Of the 6219 verses of the Qur'an, 500-600 verses contain
a legal element, but only roughly 80 verses may be classified as legal
injunctions in the narrow sense of the term." The legal matter, in
128. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 3-12.
129. EsPOSrrO, supra note 120, at 3-12.
130. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 3.
131. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 19 (1990).
132. See jii at 12, 19 (noting, however, that .hti/adwas legitimate mechanism for deridhg
Shari'a only in second and third centuries of Islam, or between A.D. 722 and A.D. 822).
133. Seei& at 12-13 (tradnglife ofProphetMuhammadandrevelation ofholylawcontained
in Qur'an to him by Allah); ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at -5 (providing history of Qur'an and
noting features of its content); HODRINSON, supra note 11, at 3 (describing Qur'an and its
genesis).
134. HODYINSON, supra note 11, at 3.
135. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 3.
136. HODYINSON, supra note 11, at 3.
137. See Noel Coulson, A History ofislamic Lau, in 2 ISLAMIC SURvEvs 17 (1964).
138. SeeAN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 20; se also ESPOsro, supr note 120, at 3 (stating that
Qur'an contains only 80 verses concerning legal injunctions). The exact number of legal
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the Western sense of the word, most expressly regulated in the
Qur'an is the law of succession." 9 In this context, one should keep
in mind that a primary function of the Qur'an was to effectively
reform or replace, to the ultimate betterment of society, the custom-
ary law governing pre-Islamic tribes in Arabia. 4 To this end, the
Qur'an was very effective. For example, in the law of marriage, the
Qur'an limited previously unrestrained polygamous practices by
forbidding a man to marry more than one wife unless he could treat
his wives equally and impartially:
Marry women of your choice, two, three or four. But if ye fear that
ye shall not be able to deal justly [with them] then only one
141
While this verse is often interpreted as "sanctioning" polygamy, a
lesser-cited verse lends a different perspective:
Ye are never able to be fair and just as between women, even if that
were your ardent desire1
42
Hence, in a radical departure from the customs of pre-Islamic Arabia,
Qur'anic scripture seems not only to limit polygamy, but also to
suggest that the criteria imposed by the Qur'an for the practice of
polygamy are virtually impossible to meet." Thus, at the very least,
the Qur'an seems to discourage customary pre-Islamic polygamy.
Succession is also an example of the reforms engendered by the
Qur'an.11 In tribal customary law, succession was based solely on
inheritance through male descent"' But the Qur'an changed this
practice:
prescriptions in the Qur'an, however, is disputed. At least one scholar, for example, maintains
that as many as 200 verses may constitute edicts of law. See HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 3
("There are no more than 200 verses concerned with what we would term 'law' in the western
sense.").
139. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 3 (stating that law of succession is only area of lavw
receiving detailed treatment in Qur'an).
140. HODKINSON, supranote 11, at8 (explaining thatwhile SunniMuslins believe that Shari'a
reformed existing customary tribal laws, Shi'a Muslims believe that Shar'a effectively invalidated
all that came before it, and was foundation of brand new system of law). There are many
differences between Sunni Islam and Shi'a Islam. Among these differences are the sources of
Shari'a themselves. The assumptions made by this Article rest largely on the study of Sunni
belief, which is dominant in the Islamic world. See id. at 7, 8 (stating that as many as 90% of all
Muslims are Sunni). There are different schools within Sunni Islam. For a detailed discussion
of these schools, and their significance, see infra Part II.B.
141. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 4 (citing The Qur'an IV:3).
142. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 4 (citing The Qur'an IV:129).
143. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing Qur'anic verses that allow
polygamy only if husbands can treat each wife equally, but then state that no husband can treat
multiple wives equally).
144. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 5 (stating that inheritance is example of Qur'anlc
reform of existing practices in that women were accorded inheritance rights where they had
none in pre-Islamic Arabia).
145. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 5.
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[The Qur'an introduced] the golden rule of inheritance, the
primacy of distribution of certain fixed shares to several categories
of Quranically designated heirs comprised mainly of the nearest
female relatives excluded under the agnatic system [inheritance
through male descent]. After these Quranic claims have been
satisfied, the residue of the estate is avarded to the nearest male
(agnate) relatives.'
While the Qur'an introduced progressive changes to the existing
tribal framework in place at the time of the divine revelations, there
were verses of the Qur'an that were seemingly irreconcilable and
inconsistent with each other.147 In order to achieve consistency in
Qur'anic guidelines, a mechanism called naskh developed, which
renders certain verses null and void through a process of repeal.'
m
Naskh, primarily a Sunni practice,"4 is principally responsible for the
general content of Sharila as it is presently known and practiced by
various communities.'-5
2. The Sunna as a source of Shari'a
The Sunna is the record of the life experiences and the deeds of
the Prophet Muhammad' as maintained in the hadith.1' 2  The
different versions of the hadith were not compiled until approximately
the ninth century, when it was discovered that hadith works dif-
fered, 3 and that many of the hadith collections were fabricated."r
146. EsPOSrro, supra note 120, at 5.
147. SeeHODINSON, supra note 11, at 3 (stating that verses that contradict each other have
"defeated the attempts at reconciliation of even the most ingenious jurists. who have had to fall
back on attempts to discover which verse abrogates which").
148. SeeAN-NA'iM, supra note 131, at 21 (discussing possibility of applying nasM in modem
day to achieve legal reforms). Professor An-Naim argues that nas, unlike Utihad, as never
definitively inactivated as a mechanism for reforming the Skril; the process of nask remains
open as a principle of interpretation, so that where there are conflicting prescriptions of Sharila,
guidance should be obtained from both the Quran and the Sunna, see infrn Part ILA.2, as well
as by legal jurists in order to arrive at the most Islamically favorable outcome. Professor An-
Na'im likens this process to determining legislative intent. Ai.NA'iM, supra note 131, at 57-60.
A shortcoming of this proposal is subjectivity of the jurists who may favor repressive interpreta-
tions.
149. Sunni refers to the branch of Islam to which the vast majority (over 90%) of Muslims
belong. ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 135 n.2; supra note 140 (noting major difference between
Sunni and Shi'a Islam, with latter being second largest branch of Islam).
150. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 21 (describing acceptance of nashh by various Sunni
jurists and schools of thought as foundation of modem principles of Shari'a).
151. NOELJ. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISWIAICJURISPRUDENCE 4 (1969).
152. EsPosITo, supra note 120, at,6 (defining hadith as collected record in compendia of
Prophet Muhammad's words and deeds).
153. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at6. The differentversions ofthe hadithhave been attributed
to discord over the significance of various incidents in Prophet Muhammad's life, which led to
varying interpretations, and, ultimately, regional Suna. Id. at 115.
154. SeeESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 6 (stating that recognition ofhadith fabrications during
ninth century led to effort to find more authentic hadith); s.e also AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at
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The process of arriving at an authentic hadith involved examining the
narrators who propagated a particular version and scrutinizing the
subject matter of a particular version in order to determine whether
or not it was in conflict with the Qur'an.155 By the latter part of the
ninth century, the major collections of hadith that withstood the tests
of authenticity had been identified. 15 6  Questions surrounding the
authenticity of these collections, however, persist'57
3. Qiyas and jma as sources of Shari'a
Because the source of qiyasis human interpretation, it is considered
to be a subordinate source of law.l s In addition, because qiyas
involves human interpretation, it is closely related to the concept of
ijtihad (interpretation).' 59 Oyas may be effectively marshaled when
the reason for or cause of a situation requiring legal adjudication
resembles one for which a definitive Shari'a pronouncement has
already been made."6 Thus, qiyas involves analogical reasoning. An
example of qiyas at work is the analogy drawn between the Qur'anic
penalty for theft and the "theft" of a bride's virginity.16' The sum
for a minimum dower or mahr, the minimum amount to which a
bride is entitled from her husband at the time of marriage,162 was
fixed according to a scaled version of the penalty for theft.lt0
Specifically, minimum dowers in Kufa and Medina, two cities central
22 (quoting S.G. Vesey-Fitzgerald, Nature and Sources of the Sharia, in LAV IN THE MiDDLE EAsT
93 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert Liebesny eds., 1955)) (discussing phenomenon of fabrication
and need for authentication). The problem of fabrication is largely attributable to the lack of
first-hand knowledge of the practice of the Prophet and his companions. Speculation, therefore,
inevitably played a part in the compilations of the hadith as they were passed on through time.
SeeAN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 22-23. The authentication process was itself flawed because It
depended on the unverifiable criterion of the "reliability" of sources of the hadith. Sce Ud.
155. See ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 6.
156. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 6. Of the numerous collections of the hadith that emerged
in the ninth century, only six are considered "genuine." Id. at 7; see also AN-NA'IM, supra note
131, at 22-23.
157. AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 23 (suggesting that some fabrication may still exist among
six "authentic" Sunna compilations and among discarded or poorly ranked Sunna compilations):
see also ESPoSITO, supra note 120, at 7, at 112-13 (discussing attacks on hadith collections and
acknowledging existence of "forgeries" and inauthentic hadith).
158. HODRINSON, supra note 11, at 5.
159. ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 7 (defining itihad as personal or independent juristic
reasoning or interpretation).
160. SeeAN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 25 (noting that qiyas has been resisted precisely because
it is product of human reasoning rather than divine revelation and suggesting that qiyas should
be limited to cases where none of other sources is applicable); ESpOSITO, supra note 120, at 7
(describing qiyas as extension of ruling in one situation to another situation that is similar in
reason or cause).
161. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 7.
162. See ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 7.
163. See ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 7.
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to the development of Islamic civilization, were fixed at the threshold
values that stolen goods had to be worth before authorities would
amputate a thief's hand." It is important to note here that, while
the analogy between a woman's virginity and "stolen goods" may be,
at best, offensive, it.is a man-made analogy, and is not directly derived
from the Qur'an.1s This is but one instance where a sexual stereo-
type is attributable to human judgment rather than to religious
prescription.'6
While human judgment may have interpreted the Qur'an to the
ultimate detriment of women in some respects, the principle of qiyas
facilitates the application of Islam to new problems and situations
without actually purporting to interpret divine revelation.
1 7  This
is an important point because, while the gates of #jtihad may have
been effectively dosed after the ninth century A.D., qiyas provided a
window of opportunity whereby new principles could be developed
with the support of preexisting Shari'a as a legitimating force.le
The final main source of Shaia, fjma, is defined as the consensus
of qualified legal scholars of a given generation."6 ljma is consid-
ered infallible, as the Prophet was once deemed to have said, "'[M]y
community will never agree on an error.'"170 While the Qur'an and
Sunna are generally thought to be preeminent over jma, it is also
widely contended that only those interpretations of the Qur'an and
Sunna that have passed the test of Yjma are authoritative.17 ' A
problem with the Yjma principle is the difficulty of its logistical
implementation: "How to secure or prove the agreement of scholars
who were scattered far and wide throughout the Islamic empire?""
The problem of achieving agreement, or even proving that agreement
164. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 7.
165. Seegmeray ESPOSrro, supra note 120, at 7 (noting that, by its nature, qiyas applies where
no definitive pronouncement on given issue exists).
166. See genera/ly Esposrro, supra note 120, at 7 (noting that application of qta principle
occurs when no pronouncement exists on given issue, hence, by implication, suggesting that
mahr example involved qias and therefore human judgment).
167. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 24-25.
168. See AN-NAIM, supra note 131, at 25 (pointing out that qijas served useful function in
allowing for development of Shari'a without having to exercise #Iihad, which vas impermissible
after ninth centuryA.D.).
169. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 4.
170. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 4.
171. See AN-NA'lI, supra note 131, at 23 (stating that qiua is pow'erful influence over
development of Shari'a because it determines interpretation and application of Qur'an and
Sunna); see also HODKINSON, supra note 11, at4 (maintaining that lrna is most importantsource
of Shai'a because it infuses interpretations of Qur'an and Sunna with authority).
172. HODMNSON, supra note 11, at 4-5.
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has been reached, is one with which Muslim scholars continue to
grapple.
17 3
B. Schools of Islamic Law
The various schools of Islamic law came about in response to
disillusionment in the Islamic world during the mid-seventh to mid-
eighth centuries. 74 During this period, known as the Ummayad,
qadis, or judges, were entrusted with interpreting the law.175 A
belief that the qadis were failing in their duty to "incorporate and
implement the spirit of Quranic reforms" resulted in growing discon-
tent.176 Various schools of law sprang up in major cities throughout
the Islamic world and Imams (religious leaders) associated themselves
with these schools. 77  The different schools of Islamic law were
subsequently named after the Imams who founded them. 78 The
four major surviving schools are the Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki, and
Hanbali.179
The differences between these schools are at times significant with
respect to the rights accorded to women." For example, the
Hanbali school recognizes a woman's right to determine certain
nonessential but enforceable provisions of her marriage contract,
while the Hanafi school does not.18' The schools also differ in their
treatment of divorce by judicial process." Under Hanafi law,
women have very narrow grounds for instigating court-mandated
173. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 4-5.
174. See EsposrTo, supra note 120, at 2 (documenting history of various schools of Islamic
law).
175. SeeEsposrro, supra note 120, at 2 (describing chronology ofjuristic decisionmaking and
its guardians).
176. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 2.
177. see Esposrro, supra note 120, at 2 (describing origin of schools of law during eighth
century and eventual emergence of great Imams).
178. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 2 (identifying Imams as Muhammad al-Shafi'l, Abu
Hanifa, Malik ibn Anas, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal).
179. AN-NA'Im, supra note 131, at 18 (describing founding of schools and mentioning that
school founded by Awaz'i did not survive). The schools originated in four main centers: Mecca,
Medina, Kula, and Baghdad. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 2. The followers of these schools
associated themselves with one of the four great Imams of the time. SZ supra note 178
(identifying Imams). These developments occurred primarily in the eighth and ninth centuries,
Esposrro, supra note 120, at 2-3. For a discussion of the differences between the four schools,
see infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text; infra Part III.
180. See generally EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 20-48 (discussing main features of classical
Muslim family law, with some attention to differences between various schools of law).
181. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 23 (noting that Hanbali school allows women to regulate
or prohibit polygamy in her marriage contract).
182. See generally EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 34-35 (discussing grounds for divorce available
to women under different schools).
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dissolution of a marriage}e By contrast, under the Malild school,
a wife may file for a court-ordered divorce under relatively broader
grounds." Islam underscores the importance of the differences
among various schools of law by giving Muslims the right to switch
schools." A [Sunni] Muslim may, "even for the sake of conve-
nience where one school's legal regime proves more favourable to his
purposes than another's," ' adopt a different school."s
C. The Distinction Between Public and Private Shari'a
The Shari'a is a code of law regulating both public and private
life. 1' The areas of law included in the public domain are constitu-
tional order, criminal law, and international and human rights
law.8 9 Private Shari'a includes laws governing religious practice and
personal life.lt The distinction between these two spheres is not
always clear, and some overlap exists." The Women's Convention
seeks to impact both extra-governmental, private conduct as well as
public law in signatory states and hence is unconcerned with any
distinction between the two spheres." Many Islamic nations, by
contrast, are very much aware of the public/private distinction,
adopting secular Western norms in the realm of public law, but
183. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 34-35 (setting out circumstances under which courts
may grant divorce under Hanafi law). Esposito explains that:
a court may dissolve a marriage only ift (1) the marriage is irregular, (2) a person who
has the option to dissolve the marriage exercises it (3) the parties are prohibited from
marriage by fosterage; (4) the marriage was contracted ly non-Muslims who
subsequently adopt Islam (or vice versa); (5) a husband is unable to consummate the
marriage; or (6) he is missing.
Id. at 35.
184. SeeEsPosrro, supra note 120, at 35 (stating that, under Maliki law, wife may divorce her
husband if he (1) is cruel; (2) refuses or is unable to maintain her, (3) deserts her, or (4) has
serious disease or ailment that would endanger her were their marriage to continue). The
Maliki school thus allows for cruelty in a marriage as a grounds for divorce. By contrast, the
Hanafi school's grounds for divorce are largely procedural, with the exception of a husband
being missing or unable to consummate the marriage. Id.
185. See HODINSON, supra note 11, at 7 (asserting that Muslims may change schools at any
time in light of mutual tolerance exhibited by each).
186. HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 7.
187. See HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that changing schools is accepted practice).
But se-eEsposrro, supra note 120, at 95-96 (stating that tradition is not to combine teachings, but
to follow one school).
188. SeeAN-NA'/M, supra note 131, at 1.
189. AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 1.
190. AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 1.
191. SeeAN-NA'im, supra note 131, at 1 (noting thatsome private matters, such as inheritance
and family law, have constitutional ramifications).
192. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, at 197 (seeking to regulate marriage and
family relations in signatory states). See genem Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 2, at
194-95 (mandating that States Parties must undertake to abolish customary practices that
discriminate against women, as well as public and institutional discrimitation against women).
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continuing to follow the Shari'a in matters of personal status or
private law. 9 While private law reform has occurred, the real value
of these reforms is contested, oftentimes serving as mere "paper
tigers.""9 Thus, the Shari'a, as it governs personal status and family
law, has traditionally proven to be more difficult to reform and, where
the Shari'a diverges from the Women's Convention, reconciling the
two may be difficult.195
Secularization of public laws is an obvious solution to the problem
of reforming public law aspects of the Shari'a that are contrary to
accepted norms. It has been contended, however, that the concept
of secularism is unworkable in the context of Islamic religious
practice. 9  Nevertheless, "[Muslims] are sensitive to tensions
between inherited wisdom and the realities of the modern world,"
11
and this awareness is reflected in the "concessions [made] to the
demands of constitutionalism and the rule of law in national and
international relations."' For example, Shari'a recognizes "the
aggressive use of force to propagate Islam and does not recognize the
equal sovereignty of non-Muslim states. These aspects of Shari'a
repudiate the basis of modem international law." 19  Another
example of the Shaii'a's inconsistency with widely accepted human
rights norms2°° is the acceptability of slavery under a literalist
interpretation of the Shari'a.20 ! The majority of Muslims condemn
such aspects of the Shari'a, which have been rejected in the laws of
193. See MINoU REEvEs, FRMALE WARRIORS OF ALuAH 29 (1989) (explaining that, in many
Islamic countries, law is amalgamation of religious and secular concepts); see also FATIMA
MERNISSI, BEYOND THE VEIL 22 (1987) (distinguishing subject matter not governed by Shar'a,
such as penal law, taxation, constitutional law, and law of war, from subject matter over which
Sharia retained control, such as religious duties, marriage, divorce and maintenance, and Inheri-
tance). But cf. REEVES, supra (noting that some Islamic nations, such as Turkey, chose to
completely eliminate religious law from their legal system).
194. Compare REEVES, supra note 193, at 29 (attesting to concessions made in Shari'a by
Islamic states to appease feminists) with ELiZ SANASARIAN, THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN
IRAN 100 (1982) (calling attempts at Shari'a reform in Iran compromises and mockeries).
195. But ef. REEVES, supra note 193, at 29 (maintaining that emerging feminist movements
have forced Islamic countries to move slowly away from traditional system, where Western
principles governed public law and Shadia governed private law). Compare with SANASAPJAN,
supra note 194, at 97 (stating that Iran's personal status law reforms merely refined existing
Shari'a) and MERNISSI, supra note 193, at 22 (stating that religious laws remain uncontested),
196. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rigts:
Chal/enge and Reponse, 20 CORNELL INT'L L. 317,319 (1987) (stating that, traditionally, Muslims
find secular reforms to their religious laws unacceptable).
197. An-Na'im, supra note 196, at 319.
198. An-Na'im, supra note 196, at 319.
199. AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 9.
200. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 9 (stating that Shadi'a violates some of most
fundamental human rights standards).
201. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 9 (stating that slavery may be reestablished under
Shari'a if certain conditions are met).
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Islamic states. 2 Thus, where aspects of the Shari'a's public law are
repugnant to international norms, the latter have been adopted.2 °
Important exceptions to the adoption of international norms in the
public context do exist, however. In Pakistan, for example, there has
been a recent reversion to Islamic evidentiary requirements that
disproportionately work to the detriment of women.2 14 Neverthe-
less, with few exceptions, public law in Islamic countries is largely
consistent with international consensus.20 This point is under-
scored by the lack of Sha7ia-based reservations registered against
Articles 7 and 8 of the Women's Convention, which deal with the
equality of women in public life and women's right to adequate
representation °.2 " Traditional Sharila, by contrast, limits women's
ability to participate in public life.0 7
Private law reform has proven to be a totally different matter,
however. The general condemnation of some practices sanctioned by
the Shari'a that run against the grain of human rights norms in the
public sphere has not been matched in the private sphere. - One
obvious explanation for this dichotomy between the public and
private spheres is that "the reform of personal status codes appears to
many men not as an advantage but as a loss of rights and powers...
deep psychological biases and fears mesh with religion and tradition
and with the total organization of society to form a barrier. ... ."'
Iran's history of personal law reform exemplifies the continued
deference accorded to practices that are oppressive to women" and
reflects the experiences of other Islamic states.2 ' Though Iran has
202. SeeAN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 9.
203. Cf. AN-NAIM, supra note 131, at 9 (discussing consensus of Muslim nations with
international community that slavery is reprehensible).
204. SeeAn-Na'im, supra note 196, at 328 (discussing violations of human rights as result of
re-introduction of public Shari'a in Pakistan); infra Part In.D (setting out Pakistani evidentiary
requirements and punishments harking back to literalist Sharila).
205. See Nikki Keddie & Lois Beck, Introduction to Wo.MN iN ThE MuSLIt WORLD 1, 27-28
(Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978) (noting ease with which public Islamic law has been
reconciled with international practice, particularly when compared with embedded nature of
traditional family law).
206. ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 40-48 (providing text of Articles along
with list of reserving States Parties and their reasons for reserving).
207. An-Na'im, supra note 196, at 330-31 (describing effects of public Sharia on women,
including bar on women holding executive orjudicial positions).
208. See Keddie & Beck, supra note 205, at 27 (noting that personal law aspect of Shari'a has
been tenaciously held onto in most Islamic countries).
209. Keddie & Beck, supra note 205, at 28.
210. See SANASAmAN, supra note 194, at 93-101 (documenting history and efficacy of legal
reforms pertaining to women in Iran).
211. Cf.jenefsky, supra note 2, at 219 (summarizing Eg)pt's current personal status law and
attendant problems, such as inability of woman to personally show she has been harmed by her
husband's second marriage as grounds for seeking divorce); s=e also supra notes 89.102 and
accompanying text (discussing reservations to Women's Convention registered by Eg)pt, Tunisia,
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not acceded to the Women's Convention, it is a potential States Party
given its membership within the U.N.212 While Iran was largely
regarded as liberated under the Shah's reign, some scholars maintain
that Shari'a "remained untouched in laws concerning women,
especially in the areas of morality, marriage, divorce and basic family
relations,"211 in spite of apparent personal law reforms.214  With
the passage of the Family Protection Act in 1967,21" Iran took steps
to restrict polygamy by requiring court permission when a man sought
to marry a second wife, and mandating that the failure to obtain such
permission is a penal offense. 216  Iran's polygamy reform was in
effect drawn from the Qur'anic verse requiring equal treatment of
wives.2 17  Iran also sought to regulate divorce under the Family
Protection Act.21 ' Prior to the Act, Iran allowed unilateral divorce
by a husband if two witnesses were present at the time that he pro-
nounced the Qur'anic divorce formula (talaq) 19  Further, in
contrast to a husband's unilateral and untrammeled right to divorce
under Iranian law, a wife could divorce only in the event of her
husband's impotence, insanity, inability to provide for her,
ill-treatment of her, or contagious disease.220 With the advent of the
Family Protection Act, Iran allowed divorce, for both parties, only with
and Morocco).
212. B'nai B'rith Women, List of States Parties (as of January 25, 1994), at 2 (May 1994)
(listing United Nations Member States that have not yet ratified Women's Convention) (on file
with The American University Law Review).
213. SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 94.
214. See SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 94-97 (referring to Family Protection Acts of 1967
and 1975 and noting that while Acts sought to reform marriage, divorce, and general family
relations, reforms were often superficial).
215. See SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 94.
216. See SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 94 (citing to 1967 Family Protection Act, art. 14
(repealed 1975)).
217. See SANASAIAN, supra note 194, at 94 (indicating that 1967 Family Protection Act
adopted provision from Qur'an that requires man who doubts ability to treat wives equally to
refrain from remarrying); see also supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (quoting text of
Qur'anic verse mentioned in 1967 Act).
218. See SANASARiAN, supra note 194, at 95 (noting that Act required court permission for
divorce and expanded divorce rights for both spouses in cases of imprisonment, addiction,
abandonment, or court conviction of either spouse or remarriage of husband without wife's
consent).
219. See SANAsARiAN, supra note 194, at 95 (stating that although Iranian law required
presence of two witnesses, requirement was rarely enforced). For a comprehensive overview of
divorce in Islamic law, see EsPoSrro, supra note 120, at 28-39 (listing and describing various
forms of divorce in Islam and their consequences). One of the customary forms of divorce
practiced by Muslims, known as talaq, enables a husband to unilaterally divorce his wife with the
utterance of one of several expressions three times. See id. at 30-31 (discussing talaqprocedure).
The wife is not a part of this procedure and, in effect, has no particular right to be present or
to even be informed that she has been divorced. Id. at 31.
220. SeeSANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 95 (citing CML CODE OF IRAN, arts. 1121, 1122, 1129,
1130, 1133, 1134).
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a court's permission." In theory, Iran's reforms looked promising.
In practice, however, the reforms were ineffective because of the
continued adherence to customary practices and legal loopholes in
the wording of the law, which further entrenched men's superior
position in Iran's legal and social hierarchy.2
Problems of implementation are difficult to overcome, particularly
when more than one interpretation of a legal provision is possible.
This is exemplified in the instance of the expanded divorce rights
granted under the Family Protection Act of 1967, which granted
divorce rights when a husband remarries without the consent of his
original wife.2" It is possible to interpret this law as enabling either
the husband or original wife to obtain a divorce based on the wife's
refusal to consent. 4 A reformatory approach would recognize only
a wife's right to obtain a divorce following her unwillingness to
consent to her husband's second marriage. The goal of expanding
women's rights is compromised by providing husbands with additional
grounds for divorcing their wives, in addition to their already
untrammeled rights to divorce. What follows a wife's refusal to
consent to her husband's second marriage depends on the enlighten-
ment of the judiciary in enforcing the laws to her advantage, or on
whether a woman is informed of her rights and enterprising enough
to exercise them.2" Thus, reform of the personal law system
221. See SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 95 (noting that court could not issue divorce unless
convinced reconciliation was impossible).
222. See SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 97 (finding that reforms are often "skin deep" or
ineffective due to women's lack of knowledge of their rights and restrictive interpretation of
reforms by judiciary) (quoting J.N.D. Anderson, Modem Trends in Islar= Legd Rform and
Modemisation in the Midd& East 20 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 1, 21 (1971)). For example, under the
polygamy reform, a court would contact the first wife of a man petitioning to contract a second
marriage "when possible" in order to determine whether a man is capable of supporting more
than one wife. ld. at 94. This provision effectively left the participation of the first wife in this
process to the court's discretion. Additionally, implementation problems resulted because
financially and socially dependent women could be forced to agree to a polygamous union. Id.
at 95. The 1967 Family Protection Act added several other conditions under which a divorce
could be obtained, such as imprisonment of a spouse, addiction, abandonment, and remasriage
of a husband without his wife's consent, which, while increasing awife's opportunities to divorce
her husband in theory, was inconsistently applied in practice so that women did not see equal
divorce rights. ML at 97. For example, the right to divorce based on remarriage of a husband
contracting a second marriage without his first wife's permission applied to 'toh husband and
wife. See ad. (stating that although reforms increased number of grounds available to women
seeking divorces, these new grounds were also available to men).
223. &eSA sARAN, supra note 194, at 97 (indicating that implementation and enforcement
of new divorce reforms was weak and inconsistent).
224. See SANAsARtAN, supra note 194, at 95 (noting that Article 11 of Family Protection Act,
which provides for expanded divorce rights, addresses itself to both men and women).
225. See SANASARIAN, supra note 194, at 97 (indicating that reforms are meaningless unless
women are aware of and exercise rights and judiciary interprets rights broadly) (quoting
Anderson, supra note 222, at 21).
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requires the formulation of airtight laws that are not subject to
manipulation by a potentially biased judiciary.
D. Conclusions on the Shari'a
From the foregoing discussion, several general conclusions may be
drawn. First, Islam and, by extension, the Shari'a, were revolutionary
phenomenon in pre-Islamic Arabia that reformed the status quo and,
thus, benefitted society as a whole and women in particular."'
Second, the various schools of Shai'a, with their different legal
prescriptions, have prevented formation of an altogether uniform
Shari'a.2 7 Third, the previous point is underscored by the very
nature of the sources of Shari'a. The Shari'a consists not just of the
Qur'an, but also of any of six compilations of the deeds and actions
of the Prophet Muhammad, comprising the hadith of the Sunna.
228
Further, elements of subjectivity are a factor when considering the
nature of ijma (consensus) and qiyas (reasoning by analogy) .22 It
is reasoned that ijma (note that ijma cannot be taken back, as it was
considered permanently binding once pronounced)2 ° is a most
important source of law, because it is only through ijma that interpre-
tations of the Qur'an and Sunna are legitimated and given authorita-
tive force.23' The principle of qiyas at work was illustrated by the
analogy drawn between a bridal dower and the penalty for theft.
2 2
Such analogies are man-made interpretations of divine law. 
23
Moreover, while a strictly Islamic society does not allow for secular law
reform, 234 it has been shown that, in many Islamic countries, the
laws already in force reflect a combination of the religious and the
secular, and that even within the religious, reform has been attempt-
ed.235 Problems with loopholes in reform language, restrictive
226. SeeEsposrro, supra note 120, at 14-15 (documenting condition of women in pre-Islamlo
Arabia and noting that Islam brought profound social changes and elevated women's status).
227. Seesupranotes 174-87 and accompanying text (discussing various schools of Islamic law).
228. See supra notes 133-57 and accompanying text (discussing both Qur'an and Sumna as
sources of Shari'a).
229. See supra notes 158-73 and accompanying text (addressing qiyas and ijma as sources of
Shari'a).
230. See EsposrTo, supra note 120, at 122 (explaining that while ijma was initially dynamic
process that allowed for adapting law as times changed, it eventually became rigid and
inflexible).
231. See HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that only interpretations of Qur'an and
Sunna sanctioned by ijma are authoritative and definitive).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66.
233. See supra text accompanying note 165.
234. SeeHODKINSON, supra note 11, at 5 (stating that, because Shai'a is divinely obtained law,
"human legislation" is not provided for).
235. See supra notes 193-221 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of secular Western
principles in public law and attempts to reform religious law).
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interpretation by the judiciary, and infrequent use of reforms by
women all impede effective utilization of the reforms.2M
Ill. THE PRACTICE AND REFORm OF SHARIA IN SELECT STATES
The effect of the Sharida on women's lives becomes dear when it is
studied in the context of its practice in various states. Some exam-
ples, most notably from Iran, have already been mentioned.' This
section focuses on the history and application of Shari'a-based
personal laws and their reform in four countries, namely Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan. Of these countries, Morocco, Tunisia,
and Egypt have acceded to the Women's Convention,' albeit with
substantial reservations. 9 Pakistan is a potential States Party given
its membership within the U.N.2' The focus on these four coun-
tries will illustrate several points, among them, the interaction and
interrelationship of legislative laws and the school of law that the
majority populations in these countries traditionally subscribe to; the
creative application of traditional Islamic reform mechanisms to
achieve results desired by those in power-, the importance of activism
at the grassroots level in precipitating change; the inadequacy of laws
that provide loopholes through which reformatory effects may be
avoided; and the politicization of Islam and the practice of cloaking
regressive laws in "Islamic" terms to achieve political purposes.
A. Morocco
As a traditionally Maliki country, Morocco emphasizes those aspects
of Shari'a specific to the Maliki school, but also departs from
characteristically Maliki teachings where necessary in order to achieve
reforms.24' As previously discussed, the Mallki school allows women
236. Seesupra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (discussing problems of implementation,
interpretation, and enforcement of reforms).
237. See supra notes 210-22 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties of implementing
private law reform in Islam with result that Shari'a remained largely untouched, and illustrating
this principle with Iran's history of personal law reform).
238. CEDAW Repor4t, supra note 7, at 154-57 (providing list of States Parties to Women's
Convention).
239. CEDAWRepor, supra note 7, at 154-56 (identifying Morocco, Tunisia, and Egpt among
States Parties declaring reservations to Women's Convention); Report of Gte &crdar-Genera supra
note 10, at 8-10 (providing text of Morocco's declaration on and reservations to Articles 2, 9,
15, 16, and 29); ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 54, 122, 133 (providing text of
Tunisia's reservations to Articles 9, 15, and 16 of Women's Convention); id. at 10, 52, 131
(providing text of Egypt's reservations to Articles 2, 9, and 16 of Women's Convention).
240. See B'nai B'rith Women, supra note 212, at 2 (listing U.N. Member States rho are
potential States Parties, including Pakistan).
241. See Vanessa Maher, tomen and Social Change in Morowc, in WMEN EI THE MUSUM
WORLD, supra note 205, at 100, 101 (indicating Moroccan society was integrated by common
adherence to Maliki Islam and its particular body of tradition); se aLso MERIssi0 s pra note 193,
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to acquire judicially decreed divorces under relatively more liberal
circumstances than Hanafi women.21 In other aspects, however,
Maliki law is more conservative. Maliki women, for example, may
have their marriages arranged without their consent and against their
will, even as adults, unless they have been married previously.2 4 In
order to counteract this provision of the Maliki school, Morocco has
enacted several safeguards that do not directly contravene the
provision. For example, Morocco passed a minimum age for marriage
of fifteen years." This means that a young Moroccan woman
cannot be contracted in marriage against her will until she is fifteen
years old. Another provision of Moroccan law provides that, while a
marriage guardian may still fix a woman's marriage on her behalf, as
mandated by the Maliki school, "no adult woman may be contracted
in marriage without her consent unless the court accepts the
guardian's application to marry her on the grounds that he is
concerned about her moral welfare."2  This "moral welfare"
provision illustrates that, while the possibility that a woman is given in
marriage against her will is substantially curtailed, loopholes in the law
exist in that there is substantial room for discretion in determining
what constitutes "concern about moral welfare."246
In the area of polygamy, while Morocco has not restricted the
practice directly, family law reforms enacted in 1958 created a
provision allowing a woman to stipulate in her marriage contract that
she has the right to divorce her husband should he subsequently
remarry.247 This practice was borrowed from the Hanbali school of
law, which recognizes the validity of such contractual stipulations, as
long as they do not negate the essential aspects of the marriage
itself.
248
at 181 n.38 (identifying regions in which various schools of Sunni Shari'a predominate).
242. Supra note 184 and accompanying text.
243. SeeNoel Coulson & Doreen Hichcliffe, Women and Law Reform in Contemporay Islam, in
WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WORLD, supra note 205, at 37, 39 (noting that Maliki countries did not
traditionally require consent of both spouses to contract them in marriage and pointing out that
Morocco still requires women to be represented by guardian in contracting marriage).
244. See id. at 41 (stating that minimum age for marriage in Tunisia and Morocco is 15).
245. IR
246. See id.
247. SeeESPOSrro, supra note 120, at 93 (noting that Morocco andJordan enacted provisions
allowing wife to retain right, in marriage contract, to divorce husband for taking second wife,
and distinguishing this feature of Hanbali law from Hanafi law).
248. See EsPOSrrO, supra note 120, at 93 (explaining that Hanbali school allows inclusion of
such stipulations in marriage contract); see also Coulson & Hichcliffe, supra note 243, at 40-41
(citing Qur'anic verse, which is basis for Hanbali provision, and noting that Hanball view has
been at forefront of reform in many Muslim countries).
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While Maliki law, which predominates in North African nations
such as Morocco,249 is conservative in according women marriage
rights, it served as the basis for law reforms in the area of divorce,
primarily because it provides the most liberal framework for granting
a woman a judicially decreed divorce.' 0  Accordingly, Morocco
further restricted a husband's unfettered right to divorce by requiring
court permission in order to obtain a divorce.25
Morocco has also reformed the Qur'anic punishment for a wife's
continued "disobedience" toward her husband. The Qur'an allows a
husband to beat his wife as a "last resort" if she fails to obey him. 2
The Moroccan Code du Statut Personnel of 1958 (Code of Personal
Status) allows a battered wife to bring suit against her abusive hus-
band. 3 This expansion in legal remedies available to women is
counteracted, however, by the condition requiring physical evidence
of mistreatment and the further stipulation that such mistreatment
must be "demonstrably unbearable."- Further, it lies within a
judge's discretion whether or not the mistreatment meets the
standard.' Thus, while Moroccan law expanded women's rights in
some respects, it either left in place or created impediments to the
full realization of increased rights for women.
Developments in Morocco's legal history illustrate the positive
aspects of borrowing from different schools of Islamic laiv.
2-
However, problems of implementing new and liberalized laws, such
as awareness among women of their rights, and judicial subjectivity in
the interpretation of new laws, are realities that may impede the
effectiveness of legal reforms.2 7  In addition, loopholes built into
249. See MERNISSi, supra note 193, at 181 n.8 (referring to Maliki school as "Malekie"
school, which dominates in North Africa).
250. See Coulson& Hichdiffe, supee note 243, at41 (distinguishing MOWik law, which is more
liberal in terms of securing women's right to divorce in that it grants women divorce rights
where they are treated cruelly by their husbands or deserted, from Hanafi law, which denies
women right to divorce, and stating that Maliki law has provided basis for divorce law reform).
251. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 93 (noting that, with reforms of 1958, husband's
unilateral right of divorce under traditional Islamic law became subject to courtjurisdiction).
The 1958 legal reforms in Morocco are manifested in the Code du Statut Pennnd, which fixes
minimum ages for marriage and restricts a husband's unilateral right to divorce (talaq). Coulson
& iHchliffe, supra note 243, at 50.
252. See MERNISSI, supra note 193, at 111, 188 n.7 (referring to stun 4, verse 34 of Qur'an,
which states that beating is permissible to enforce obedience only if all other measures fWil).
253. SeeMERNIss, supra note 193, at 111, 188 n.9 (discussing progressive effect ofArticle 56
of 1958 on women's legal rights).
254. MERNISSi, supra note 193, at 111.
255. See MEtNissi, supra note 193, at 111.
256. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (discussing right to sritch Islamic
schools).
257. See SANASARAN, supra note 194, at 97 (citing Anderson's critique of legal reforms as
"skin deep" and ill-suited to realities of village women, with attendant problem of ensuring
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reforms may also defeat advances in the legal relief afforded women,
as demonstrated by the requirement of physical evidence in
wife-beating cases.Y
Despite such shortcomings, the need for Moroccan reservations
entered to Article 16 of the Women's Convention are not entirely
apparent. 9 The substantial reforms undertaken by Morocco
indicate that Shari'a can be applied in a flexible manner. Moreover,
in formulating its reservations, it does not appear that the Moroccan
Government has drawn a distinction between what is permitted and
what is prescribed under the Shari'a. For example, it would be
difficult to argue that measures such as wife-beating and polygamy are
required under the Shari'a.2 Accordingly, the Moroccan reserva-
tions may be more narrowly drawn.261
B. Tunisia
The experience of Tunisia, another North African Islamic nation,
provides an example of a different route to reform. Tunisia enacted
major reforms to existing Shari'a with the passing of the Code of
Personal Status in 1956.262 The Code abolished polygamy, required
that divorces be pronounced by a court of law, gave women the same
rights to divorce as men, and established minimum ages for mar-
riage.26 Tunisia justified these radical reforms with Qur'anic
reasoning:
The government argued that (1) polygamy, like slavery, was an
institution whose past purpose was no longer acceptable to most
people; and (2) the ideal of the Quran was monogamy. Here [a
reformist position] was espoused, namely, that the Quranic
judicial compliance with spirit of legal reforms) (quoting Anderson, supra note 222, at 21).
258. SeeMERNISSI, supranote 193, at 111 (discussingrequirement ofphysical evidence in wlfe-
beating cases). For another example of self-defeating legal reforms, see supra text accompanying
note 245 (noting that legislation banning forced marriages provided loophole allowing guardian
to contract marriage on woman's behalf where he can demonstrate to court that he is
'concerned about her moral welfare").
259. Morocco's reservation to Article 16 of the Women's Convention essentially states that
it reserves the right to accede to those provisions of the Article that are incompatible with the
Islamic Shari'a, and points to provisions "relating to the equality of men and women In respect
of rights and responsibilities on entry into and at dissolution of marriage" as examples of
provisions running contrary to the Shari'a. See Report of the Secretar,.Genera4 sultra note 10, at 9;
see also Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1) (a)-(c) (giving men and women equal right
to marry and divorce).
260. See AMINA WADUD-MUHSIN, QUR'AN AND WOMAN 84 (1992) (noting that Qur'an does
not directly sanction polygamy).
261. For the complete text of Morocco's reservations to Article 16 of the Women's
Convention, see Report of the Secretao-Genera4 supra note 10, at 9.
262. See Coulson & Hichcliffe, supra note 243, at 49-50 (documenting Tunisia's reforms
within chronological table of legal reforms throughout Muslim world).
263. Coulson & Hichcliffe, supra note 243, at 49-50.
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permission to take up to four wives (IV:3) was seriously qualified by
verse 129: 'Ye are never able to be fair and just between women
even if that were your ardent desire' (IV:129). Thus, while
polygamy was permitted, the Quranic ideal is monogamy.Z
A
This method of trying to fashion reform from Qur'anic principles
without purporting to reinterpret the Qur'an, in tandem with then-
President Bourguiba's moral authority as a historical figure of the
independence movement, contributed to the popular support and
societal legitimacy enjoyed by these reforms." Not all sectors of
Tunisian society agreed with the changes, however. Surprisingly, the
judiciary was at the vanguard of a movement of conservatives and
others with a vested interest in the traditional system opposing the
reforms.66 Nevertheless, Bourguiba's government vras able to co-
opt dissidentjudges into either accepting the new laws or transferring
to other posts.
267
Another major reason for the success of the reforms vras the
parallel mobilization of socialist forces at the grassroots level."6 The
socialist party put into force numerous programs to facilitate the
269transition. Specifically, it undertook to educate the general
population about the need for change, created the National Union
of Tunisian Women, and included women on its electoral slates.
Thus, women were enfranchised socially, economically, and politically
due in significant part to the efforts of extra-governmental actors. 2
0
The momentum of these reforms, however, was lost over time,
primarily due to Bourguiba's illness and ensuing power struggles.?'
Eventually, by the late 1960s, a traditionalist mentality began to
overtake the country and the momentum of the prior legal and social
264. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 92-93.
265. See REEVES, supra note 193, at 71 (explaining that success of reforms is largely
attributable to general respect for Bourguiba as well as his "concern to avoid rupture with the
authentic background of Tunisian society," namely, Islam).
266. See Mark A. Tessler, Women7sEmandpation in Tunisfa, inWOMEN IN THE MUSLIM WoAOnD,
supra note 205, at 141, 142 (explaining thatjustices from both religious and civil courts were
opposed to Code and sometimes refused to implement it); see atso REEvES, supra note 193, at 71
(explaining thatjudges opposed to reforms, such as judges of religious courts who had vested
interest in continuation of traditional s)stem, were unable to mobilize broad support).
267. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 142. It is reported that Bourguiba has personally
intervened in court when he felt that a woman was not being accorded her due rights.
Bourguiba appealed to jurists to be "civilized." Id.
268. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 143 (discussing role of Neo-Destour Party in efforts to
resocialize population to accept changes).
269. Tessler, supra note 266, at 143.
270. See ganeraly Tessler, supra note 266, at 143 (discussing activities of National Union of
Tunisian Women including meetings held to discuss health, child care, birth control, and
professional problems faced by women).
271. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 144-46.
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reforms was never regained.2 2 As a result of decreasing governmen-
tal emphasis on law reform and equal status for women, such goals
lost support with the Tunisian polity.273 While unofficial efforts at
reform continued, 74 they required governmental support in order
to win wide-scale societal approval.275
While the momentum of the reforms may have slowed, the gains
made in the wake of Tunisian independence as a result of dynamic
legal reforms remain apparent.276 The success of the Tunisian
reforms seems to rest on several factors. As mentioned earlier,
important ingredients contributing to the success of the reforms
included the legitimacy of Bourguiba's leadership, combined with
unofficial grassroots reform movements working in tandem with the
official machinery.277 An additional factor was the appeal of reforms
imbued with Islamic legitimacy.27 In outlawing traditional main-
stays of the Shari'a as it is practiced, such as polygamy and talaq (a
husband's unilateral power to divorce his wife through the pro-
nouncement of a repudiation formula279) the reforms were "innova-
tive reinterpretation[s]" of religious laws.2 °  Bourguiba character-
ized the Tunisian legal reforms as accomplishing as much as is
possible "in terms of reform of personal law, while still remaining a
Muslim state."281 Tunisia is an illustration of progressive changes
272. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 147 (quoting respected Tunisian sociologist and stating
that revolutionary momentum of post-independence Tunisia was lost).
273. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 151 (noting that support for women's rights showed
marked decline between 1967 and 1973).
274. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 151 (remarling that unofficial reform efforts were not
only unsuccessful absent government support, they contributed to decline in popular support
for reforms).
275. See Tessler, supra note 266, at 151 (describing government effort necessaryto promote
popular support); supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text (discussing how decrease In
governmental priority for equal rights for women decreased societal approval of reforms).
276. SeeTessler, supra note 266, at 154 (asserting that Tunisia remains one of most advanced
Arab nations in terms of women's rights and that, in spite of deterioration of legal reforms, It
remains far ahead ofmostArab counterparts as result of post-independence reform campaign).
277. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text (stating that government and grass roots
support for legal reform were essential).
278. See Elizabeth H. White, Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women's Status in Muslim Nations,
inWOMEN IN THE MUSLIf WORLD, supra note 205, at 52,58 (contending Tunisia took "unusual"
step in comparison with Turkey and Communist Muslim states by abolishing polygamy and talaq
in context of "Islamic explanation").
279. See Coulson & Hichcliffe, supra note 243, at 37.
280. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 852-53 (stating that reinterpreting religious laws Is
successful method for reform).
281. White, supra note 278, at 59 (itemizing Tunisian reforms and respective Islamic
justifications). White's essay effectively recaps the Tunisian reforms: The abolition ofpolygamy
was founded on the Qur'anic teaching that men must practice impartiality amongst their wives,
which, according to some interpretations, is also Qur'anically impossible. Id. Unilateral divorce
for men (talaq) was also abolished based on Islamic principles that divorce is disfavored and
arbitration must be attempted when there is marital discord. L Thus, the Tunisian reforms
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inspired by Islamic traditions rather than Western precedent.' Yet,
"no other Muslim country has followed the Tunisian example,"m
opting instead for more limited reforms.'
Curiously, Tunisia has entered a reservation with respect to Article
16(c) of the Women's Convention,' which requires that women
and men enjoy the same rights and responsibilities at marriage and
at its dissolution.'86 Tunisia's extensive reform of family law suggests
that the Code of Personal Status presents little conflict with Article
16(c) of the Women's Convention.287 Nevertheless, law norms
holding impermissible the preference for domestic law as an explana-
tion for noncompliance with treaty obligations' suggest that
Tunisia's rationale for reserving the right to accede to provisions of
Article 16 is inadequate.29 Tunisia may alternatively argue, under
Article 23 of the Women's Convention, that its legislation is more
conducive to achieving equality between men and women than is
Article 16,290 rather than merely stating that certain provisions of
Article 16 "must not conflict with [select] provisions of the Personal
Status Code."2 11 Thus, as they stand, Tunisia's reservations to Article
16 seem impermissibly formulated and substantively unnecessary.
required that all petitions for divorce be arbitrated by a court of law. Id. at 58-59.
282. See REEVES, supra note 193, at 71-72 (explaining that Bourguiba's reforms were
successful, both because they remained consistent with Tunisia's Islamic heritage and because
there was general unwillingness" to breakwith Islamic traditions, as Turkey and Iran did, during
Shah's reign).
283. ESPOSITo, supra note 120, at 93.
284. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 93 (pointing to more conservative reform paths
followed by Syria and Pakistan).
285. ALL APPRopiATE I EASURES, supa note 10, at 133 (providing text of Tunisia's
reservation to Article 16, which states that Tunisia does not consider itself bound ty Article
16(1) (c), (d), (f), (g), and (h) due, in part, to conflicts thatmay existbetween Code of Personal
Status and certain provisions of Article). Tunisia does not specifically state that its reservation
is rooted in the Islamic Shari'a. ALL APPROPRiATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 13. However, this
is one possible reason, although by no means the only one.
286. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(c), at 196.
287. Compare supra note 263 and accompanying text (stating that Code abolished pol)gamy,
mandated that courts sanction divorce, gave men and women same rights to divorce, and set
minimum age for marriage) with Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(c) (statingmen and
women enjoy same rights and responsibilities at marriage and at its dissolution).
288. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing Vienna Convention pro'sion
rendering impermissible reservations invoked on grounds of domestic law).
289. SeeVienna Convention, supra note 22, art. 27. 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339 (setting out that
provisions of internal law will not serve as bar to implementing States Parties' treaty obligations).
290. See Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 23(a) (stating that legislation of States
Parties more conducive to achieving women's equality shall not be affected lr provisions of
Women's Convention).
291. ALL APPROPRIATE MFASURES, supa note 10, at 133.
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C. Egypt
Egypt's experience with the Shari'a exemplifies the dichotomy of
retaining both Western-inspired public law and Islamic personal or
family law.2" 2 Egypt was to play a pivotal role in inspiring reformist
movements in other parts of the Muslim world-a role that began
with the adoption by many Islamic countries of Egyptian scholar
Muhammad Qadri Pasha's authoritative code of laws based on the
Hanafi school and compiled under the aegis of the Egyptian
Government.29 This code "greatly influence[d] the administration
of Shari'a in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East by the turn of
the century."2" While the code was never officially enacted, its
influence as a reference for Shari'a courts was felt in various parts of
the Middle East outside of Egypt.295 When family law reform finally
did occur in Egypt in the 1920s, the Egyptian example led other Arab
countries toward reform:295 "Egyptian jurisprudence and legislation
was to provide the impetus for modernist legislation throughout the
Arab world."2' Egyptian legal reforms, and the innovative mecha-
nisms used to achieve them, were to be adopted by other Muslim
countries seeking to achieve family law reforms within the limits
prescribed by Islam. Thus, a discussion of Egypt is central to the
study of the Shari'a as it is practiced in many countries given the
trailblazing role Egypt has played in the development and reform of
the Shari'a.
Among the earlier Egyptian reformers who had a tremendous
impact on the practice and reform of Islamic law was Rifaah Badawi
Rafi al-Tahtawi, a renowned scholar of the early nineteenth century.
Tahtawi stressed the need to adapt the Shari'a to new and changing
circumstances.29 The method that he advocated was tahayyur, the
principle by which a Muslim could adopt the prevailing interpreta-
292. SeeJenefsky, supra note 2, at 216 (describing Egypt's civil and criminal codes as being
influenced by European, and particularly French, culture and laws, while family law "remained
within the exclusive purview of Islamic law").
293. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 49-50.
294. Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 216; see also Eseosrro, supra note 120, at 49-50 (stating that
Pasha's code is authoritative force for interpretation of Islamic law in courts of Egypt and other
Muslim countries).
295. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 50.
296. SeeEsposrro, supra note 120, at 51-52 (maintaining that Egyptian reforms precipitated
widespread reformist legislation in other Arab legal systems); Jenefsky, supa note 2, at 216
(stating that Egyptian jurisprudential and legislative reform influenced legislation in other Arab
countries).
297. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 52.
298. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 50.
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tions of another Sunni school in certain specific circumstances.'
As evidenced by family law reforms of the early tventieth century,
takheyyurplayed a decisive role in facilitating interpretations favoring
women.30°  Maliki interpretations, particularly, prevailed over the
predominant Hanafi ideology in influencing divorce reform.P'
Thus, takhayyur provided a legitimate mechanism for change, not only
in Egypt, but in other areas of the Muslim world as well.
Egypt's impact on reforms in other countries may also be illustrated
with reference to the teachings of Muhammad Abduh, also knovm as
the "Father of Muslim Modernism."m One example of Abduh's
influence is illustrated by the fact that he developed the Qur'anic
argument that polygamy was contrary to the Qur'an.8P Abduh
reasoned that, according to IV:3 and V:129 of the Qur'an, "more
than one wife was only permissible when equal justice and impartiality
were guaranteed."' Because such equality is practically impossible
to achieve, Abduh reasoned that the Qur'anic ideal was monoga-
my s 5  The discussion of Tunisia's reforms illustrates that this
rationale was adopted by other countries 05 and served as an argu-
ment against polygamy that could be adopted by modernist reformers
throughout the Muslim world.'
Scholars brought to bear significant, innovative changes that
became imbued with Islamic legitimacy.m For example, the
applicability of takhayyur was extended to adopt individual opinions
of scholars within a particular school as they suited the social
objectives the reforms sought to achieve. This is in stark contrast to
the traditional mandate that only the dominant opinion of a school
299. EsposTro, supra note 120, at 50, 95.
300. See EspOSrrO, supra note 120, at 50 (presenting tahajyuras principle that influenced
family law reform); see also supra note 248 and accompanying text (providing example of
takha)"ur in Moroccan context); infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text (discussing process
of takha)yur in achieving divorce reform favorable to women).
301. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 53-54 (noting that al-Tahtawi's suggestion of looking
outside of one's own school of Islamic law in order to resolve problems provided legal basis for
reforms ushered in by Law No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929).
302. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 50 (discussing Abduh's attempts to reconcile Qur'anic
principles with modem realities).
303. See EsPOSITO, supra note 120, at 50-51 (describing Abduh's argument as Qur'anic ideal
being monogamy).
304. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 51.
305. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 51.
306. Seesupra text accompanying note 264 (demonstrating theory, as applied in Tunisia, that
monogamy, not polygamy, was ideal under Qur'an).
307. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 50-51.
308. See ESPOsrrO, supra note 120, at 50 (noting that many scholars had to grapple with how
to present social reform within Islamic rationale).
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could be adopted through the process of takhayyur-°  Hence
takhayyur itself evolved and was used to justify reforms.
The effective beginnings of reform concerning women in the
twentieth century occurred around 1915 when imperial edicts of the
Ottoman Empire declared that Egyptian women had the right to sue
for divorce under certain circumstances.310 Then, in 1917, the first
official attempts at codifying Muslim family law in the modern period
were undertaken, as evidenced by the Ottoman Law of Family
Rights."' Prior to this time, the main legal development was the
requirement under the Egyptian Code of Organization and Procedure
for Shariah Courts that evidence of claims concerning certain family
law issues such as marriage and divorce must be provided in the form
of written documentation or official certification.312 Otherwise,
prior to the Ottoman reforms, Egyptian women had few divorce rights
under the predominant Hanafi school-only a husband's impotence
or a fraudulent marriage contracted prior to puberty provided
grounds for divorce.13
A watershed in Egyptian family law reform occurred when Law No.
25 of 1920 was passed. 4 The enactment of this law, and the
second phase of the reform in 1929, resulted in an expansion of
309. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 95 (noting that this extension of process of takhayjur
constituted "clear departure" from traditional understanding, which required adoption of
dominant teaching of one of four schools). Esposito refers to the attempts to correct abuse of
the divorce formula in Egypt's Law No. 25 of 1929 to illustrate that, where the formal positions
of four major Sunni schools do not allow for reformatory interpretations, the teachings of a
minority view scholar from within one of the schools were adopted in order to lend a
legitimizing force to the reforms. See id. (illustrating that reformist used minority-view position
of Hanbali scholar, Ibn Taymiyah, which states that validity of talaq divorce is dependent upon
intent to divorce rather than formalistic pronunciation of divorce formula, as means of
providing Islamic sanction to reforms). ButseeAN-NA'iM, supra note 131, at45 (maintaining that
takhayyur does not necessarily require adopting dominant opinion of given school of Islamic
law).
310. See Estosrro, supra note 120, at 53 (specifying that change in divorce law expanded
women's divorce rights beyond grounds of impotence of husband or fraudulent marriage prior
to puberty to include cases of desertion and instances where husband carried contagious disease,
such as venereal disease or leprosy).
311. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 53.
312. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 52 (describing written certification requirement as
particularly important to curbing phenomenon of child marriages because courts did not certify
marriages where bride and groom had not reached ages of 16 and 18 respectively, precluding
judicial relief where such marriages transpired). The certification requirement wvas achieved
through the doctrine of siyassa sharira, or the right of a ruler to take administative steps to
ensure the welfare of society under Shari'a rule. See id. at 52-53. This practice vas a permissible
way of achieving reform where direct intervention, such as pronouncing child marriages invalid,
would have been construed as impermissible iflihad (interpretation). See id. at 52.
313. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 53 (describing women's right to divorce In Hanai
school).
314. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 53 (characterizing reforms as establishing "broader
grounds for divorce" for women).
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divorce rights for women.1 Under this reform, a woman could
petition for divorce under the following circumstances: (1) her
husband's failure to provide her with maintenance support, also
known as nafaqah; (2) her husband's infection with a danger-
ous/contagious disease; (3) desertion by her husband; and (4)
maltreatment by her husband. 1
These reforms were significant, not only for the substantive changes
in the law that they effected, but also for the process through which
they were achieved. The Egyptian reforms were cloaked under the
veil of the "acceptable" reform mechanism of takhayyur'l By
drawing from the liberal tenets of the Maliki school's divorce law, the
Egyptian reforms counteracted the more rigid tenets of the Hanafi
school's divorce law that predominated in Egypt. 1
The process of innovative interpretation of the Shari'a to achieve
reforms without conflict with perceived Islamic ideals was not
confined to the early reform period."' 9 Relatively recent develop-
ments in family law reform are testament to the recyclability of the
various legitimating mechanisms for adapting Islamic law to changing
315. See ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 56 (stating that cruelty and desertion were added as
grounds for divorce, with cruelty as grounds for divorce finding its only support in Maliki
school).
316. SeeESPosro, supra note 120, at 53-59 (enumerating expanded divorce rights ofwomen
under new legislation, with particular emphasis on broadening women's rights due to husband's
failure to provide or pay maintenance). The legal reforms were significant not only for the
substantive changes they imparted, but also for the Islamically sanctioned reform mechanismrs
that gave rise to them. Law No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929 were particularly innovative
in the sense of breaking with Hanafi interpretations and adopting the more egalitarian views of
the Maliki school, for example, with regard to the amount of support due a wife. Id. at 54.
Hanafi law maintained thata husband was responsible only for maintenance presently owed and
that he did not incur the debt of past maintenance. Se id. (stating that only if couple had
distinct agreement about maintenance, husband would have to paypast maintenance). LavwNo.
25 of 1920 amended this practice by stipulating that cumulative debt may be required of a
husband (Article 1) and failure to pay would be grounds for a divorce (Article 4). Id. Similar
provisions were enacted in favor of divorced wives in Article 2 of the Law. Se id (stating that
divorced husband's maintenance debt owed to ex-wife should be computed from time of
divorce). Law No. 25 of 1920 further departed from the Hanafi tradition I/ decreeing in
Articles 4 and 5 that, in cases where husband had failed to pay maintenance, maintenance could
consist of any property owned by the husband, not merely those items the woman specifically
required. See iL (explaining that under classical Hanafi law, maintenance vwas paid only with
property in nature of required maintenance, such as clothing and food). The most significant
expansion of the 1920 law with regard to maintenance was a wif'e's right under Article 4 to
divorce her husband due to his incapacity or unwillingness to support her. Id. Law No. 25 of
1929 granted a similar expansion of rights. See id. at 53-54 (listing grounds available to women
for divorce under both Law No. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929). Departure from prevailing
Hanafi tradition was again evident with respect to the establishment of cruelty or maltreatment
(darar) as grounds for a woman to divorce her husband where reconciliation seems unlikely
(Article 6). I& at 56.
317. EsposiTo, supra note 120, at 53-54.
318. See EsPOSITO, supa note 120, at 54.
319. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of Shari1a
consistent with Islamic ideals in issuing Law No. 44 by Presidential decree).
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circumstances. 2° In 1979, Anwar Sadat issued Law No. 44 by
presidential decree during parliamentary recess, as provided for in the
Egyptian Constitution, so that the legislature could not block passage
of the law.321  Known as "Jihan's Law," in honor of Sadat's wife, the
provisions of Law No. 44 gave women further protection in the event
of a husband's subsequent polygamous marriage by affording a
woman the right to a divorce, as provided for in the Maliki and
Hanbali traditions, should a husband fail to inform his original wife
of a subsequent marriage or should such a marriage harm her in any
way.322  Once again, by invoking Maliki and Hanbali teachings,
reforms were attempted under the protection of Islamic sanction.
23
While Jihan's Law constituted a significant step forward in
addressing the status quo disfavoring women, other issues of concern
to women were not addressed. Specifically, polygamy remained
practicable without judicial approval, 24 and court permission was
not required for a man to divorce his wife.31 Thus, the reforms
under Jihan's Law were characterized as "an important, if still
inadequate, step forward." 26
As a result of opposition to the reforms, a decree of the Supreme
Court of Egypt struck down Law No. 44 in 1985.31 The Supreme
320. SeeJenefsky, supra note 2, at 218 (stating that Law No. 44 used Maliki and Hanball
jurisprudence in giving wife right to divorce if husband does not inform her of subsequent
marriage, or if subsequent marriage harms her).
321. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 61-62 (discussing provisions of Law No. 44 as well as
prior history of legislative opposition to its content);Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 218 (documenting
general legislative history of Law No. 44).
322. See Es'osrro, supra note 120, at 61 (pointing out that woman's right to be informed in
event of repudiation by her husband and requirement of notarized certificate of divorce serve
as safeguards against husband's repudiation, claim of repudiation without wife's knowledge, or
husband's refusal of maintenance);Jenelsky, supra note 2, at 218 (noting in addition that new
law required husband to procure notarized certificate of divorce, and also that wife must be
informed if husband is planning to divorce her or take second wife).
323. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 63 (maintaining that "a return to the Qur'an is evident"
in reforms restricting talaq, or male right of unilateral repudiation of his wife, and expanding
women's divorce, custody, and maintenance rights); supra notes 309, 315-18 and accompanying
text (discussing use of Hanbali and Maliki teachings to achieve reform).
324. SeeJenefsky, supra note 2, at 219 (discussing retention by men of right to practice
polygamy and attain divorce without court permission, in spite of other reforms).
325. SeeEsposrro, supra note 120, at 63 (noting irony of Egypt's lack of legislation onjudiclal
approval for divorce and polygamous marriages given its status as "a leader in family law reform
in the Middle East and ... a country in which women enjoy a relatively advanced status").
326. Margot Badran, Competing Agenda: Feminists, Islam and the State in Nincteenth. and
Twentieth-Gentury Egypt in WOMEN, ISLAM & THE STATE 201, 224 (Deniz Kandiyoti ed., 1991)
(noting that, in addition to"inadequa[cy]" of reforms from feminist point of view, dissatisfaction
with reforms was palpable among men, due to "unprecedented" manner in which they were
passed).
327. See id. at 225 (stating that Government canceled Law No. 44); see alsoJenefsky, supra
note 2, at 219 (noting that law was struck down on grounds that it was unconstitutional because
power to issue Presidential decrees was "limited to 'emergency' situations" and did not extend
to personal status law).
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Court's ruling highlights the arbitrary nature of applying Islamic legal
justifications to reforms that are deemed "desirable." The very fact
that Law No. 44 "invoked Maliki and Hanbali jurisprudence"3 2 in
some of its tenets illustrates the application of takhayyur at work yet
again, but the law was struck down on a procedural point.s  As
previously discussed,3s Islamic law reforms had been enacted under
the doctrine of siyassa sha-ri'a s3  This doctrine conferred on a ruler
the right "to take administrative steps where necessary to insure a
society ruled by the Shafiah,"112 a doctrine of which Sadat was not
given the benefit because his Law No. 44 was not afforded the
justification of siyassa shari'a5 3
The repeal of Law No. 44, in spite of its detractors, resulted in
widespread discontent. Women's groups reacted by uniting to call for
the Law's reenactment." As a result, a new law, resembling the old
Law No. 44, was passed."a This new law, Law No. 100, is currently
the main legislation that determines the rights of women in the family
law context.3"
The Egyptian experience with Shari'a in the family law context
reveals that a variety of methods have been used to achieve reform,
in particular siyassa shari'a (administrative discretion), takhayur
(ability to adopt dominant teaching of another school), and talfiq
(patching together different schools of thought),s33 The inconsis-
328. Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 218.
329. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (explaining that Presidential decrees were
only allowed for emergency situations and not for personal status laws).
330. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
331. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 52-53 (explaining use of doctrine to reform child
marriage laws).
332. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 52-53; see aso supra note 312 and accompanying text
(discussing use of si)assa shafila to deter child marriages).
333. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (stating that law was struck do'nn for
improper use of Presidential decree).
334. SeeBadran, supra note 326, at 225 (relating that women's group's actions led to new law
restoring most of rights found in prior law);Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 219 (documenting social
agitation leading to enactment of similar law).
335. See Badran, supra note 326, at 225 (describing new law that restored most, but not all,
of women's rights lost when old lavw was struck down).
336. Seejenefsky, supra note 2, at 219 (pointing out that, while new law remained largely
similar to old Law No. 44, changes included thatjudge, rather than Wife, determines seiousness
of injury inflicted by husband's subsequent polygamous marriage, and stricter penalties in event
that provisions of law are contravened).
337. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 95 (characterizing laliq as "eclectic process" and
"variation of lakhyuh," which involves "patching together' beliefs of different schools andjurists
to result in cohesive singular law); supra notes 298-332 and accompanying text (discussing siya
shari'a, kduzyur, and ta/iq as methods of implementing reforms). Ta/fiq has been criticized as
a process that encourages deviance from the intentions of the founders ofvarious schools. Al-
NA'tI, supra note 131, at 33. It should be pointed out, however, that Qur'anic intent is superior.
Hence, efforts to discover Qur'anic intent that involve tafiq may be legitimate.
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tency with which these reforms have been applied"s suggests the
existence of an inconsistent and diluted Shari'a. Reservations to the
Women's Convention based on the Shari'a3 9 lose their relevancy in
light of Egypt's selective, results-oriented, albeit important, reforms
because Egyptian leaders and reformers have been able to legitimate
a number of reforms on Islamic bases.-" Egypt can endeavor to
complete its process of reform by following the examples of Tunisia
and Morocco in restricting polygamy based on Qur'anic rationale.3
1
At the same time, Egypt can attempt to garner support for its
adoption of "equivalency" or "complementarity" of rights3 2 as a
favorable objective as contemplated in its reservation to Article 16.14
D. Pakistan
One of the most influential leaders of the freedom struggle for
Pakistan, a state founded in reaction to the potential for Hindu
domination over Muslims in an independent India, was the Islamic
modernist M.A. Jinnah. 4  Given that Jinnah's vision guided the
founding of the Pakistani State,' and there existed diversity of
opinion about Islam among new Pakistanis, inevitable confrontations
occurred between modernists, tending towards secularism, and
traditionalists, desiring a strictly Islamic State. 46 A fertile "battle-
338. See supra text accompanying notes 327-33 (noting that Sadat was not given benefit of
doctrine of siyassa sharia when court evaluatedjihan's Law).
339. See supra text accompanying note 94 (providing text of Egypt's reservation to Article 16
based on Shari'a concept of "equivalency" of rights between men and women).
340. See supra notes 314-36 and accompanying text (documenting Egyptian family law
reforms).
341. See supra Parts IH.A-B (discussing legal reforms in Morocco and Tunisia, and
emphasizing utilization of Qur'anic reasoning to restrict polygamy).
342. See supra text accompanying note 94 (describing Shari'a vision of "equivalency of rights
and duties" between men and women).
343. See supra text accompanying note 94 (providing text of Egypt's reservation to Article 16
of Women's Convention); see also CEDAW Repor supra note 7, at 44 (documenting Libyan
representative's explanation for disproportionate inheritances accorded to female and male
children as based on level of commitment and obligation accompanying inheritance, with those
of male children being much higher). CEDAW considered this explanation by the Libyan
representative as sufficient to constitute equality. Id. Thus, Egypt may be successful in making
a similar argument in order to support its "equivalency of rights" approach vis-A-vis Article 16,
See supra text accompanying note 94.
344. See Ayesha Jalal, The Convenience of Subserience: Women and the State of Pakistan, In
WOMEN, ISLAM & THE STATE, supra note 326, at 77, 83-84 (describing role of'Jinnah In reviving
Muslim League and inspiring Muslim women to assume activist roles in relation to political
participation and self-determination). But see SHAHIDA LATEEF, MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDIA:
POLITICAL AND PRiVATE REALmES 70 (1990) (characterizingJinnah's commitment to Shari'a
reform with respect to women's rights as mere "lip service").
345. See generally FRANCIS WATSON, A CONCISE HISTORY OF INDIA 155 (1974) (describing
Jinnah's role in engineering Pakistani state).
346. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 86 (inferring that antagonism existed between "religious
lobby" and "Pakistan's early managers" due to differing levels of commitment to process of
1990
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ground" for this confrontation existed in the arena of women's
rights.3
7
The tension between traditionalists and modernists in the political
arena still exists in Pakistan.' The women's rights issue has been
played as the "trump card" in political struggles for power, 9 and it
has tipped the delicate balance between the traditional and modernist
elements whenever legal reform has been attempted in Pakistani
history.' With the passage of the Family Laws Ordinance in 1961
under General Ayub Khan's authoritarian regime, the simmering
conflict between traditionalists and modernists found a focal
point."' The Ordinance was the first in Pakistan to challenge the
existing status quo of family law.1 Although "[tihe provisions of
the Ordinance were hardly revolutionary,"' the Ordinance repre-
sented a significant development in terms of the State acting indepen-
dently of political pressure and considerations. '  The Ordinance
provided for the registration of marriages with local councils, required
that a husband seeking to take another wife must first seek the
permission of his present wife and maintain her satisfactorily, and
required payment of a dower amount at the time of divorce.'
Prior to this time, the main strides for Pakistani women in the family
law context had been achieved during the pre-partition era with the
Muslim Marriage Dissolution Act of 1939, which gave women the right
Islamization). Thus, the conflict between modernists and traditionalists may be framed in terms
of their differing views on the role of Islam in the State.
347. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 86 (noting that maintenance of 'precarious balance between
state and society" was achieved by avoiding proactive reforms and by affirmatively granting
women rights only where "Islam gave women more rights than the existing social customs).
348. See infra notes 357-70,388-98 and accompanying text (discussing progressive politicians'
tendency to stray from Islam and conservatives' practice of adherence to traditional Islamic
tenets).
349. SeJalal, supra note 344, at 101 (stating that late former president General Zia ul.Huqs
Islamization program focused on women in an effort to vin him accolades from broad spectrum
of society).
350. ee infra notes 364-67 and accompanying text (stating thatfailure ofBhutto reginme may
be attributed to inability to appease both progressives, in fvor of according women rights, and
conservative groups opposed to reforms).
351. See Jalal, supra note 344, at 95 (discussing conservative backlash in response to
progressive features of Ordinance).
352. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 95 (characterizing enactment of Family Law Ordinance as
first and only foray taken by State into "explosive matters [such] as Muslim marriage and divorce
laws").
353. SeeJalal, supranote 344, at 94 (stating that Family Law Ordinance provided Muslim men
with method to avert restrictions on polygamy).
354. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 95 (dubbing law as State's "assert[ion] of autonomy" against
traditional Islamic social order).
355. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 94 (maintaining nevertheless that loopholes existed wherebi
husband could forego obtaining permission from existing wife for subsequent marriage b rfing
application with local body that would rule on permissibility of husband's petition).
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to divorce their husbands and facilitated child custody156
The enactment of the 1961 Ordinance set off a rallying cry among
certain traditionalist elements who called for its repeal."5 7 Although
the law remained on the books, conservative discontent and general
disillusionment with the Pakistani loss to India in the liberation
campaign of Bangladesh led to political destabilization. After General
Yahya Khan's last-ditch attempts at restoring normalcy failed, the
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regime was ushered into power
a58
Islam continued to serve as a political pressurizing device after the
Bhutto regime assumed office.35 9  Bhutto was characterized by his
"'secular' social and political style"3 0° and branded "'unIslamic' 361
by religious opposition. 62 The possibility of a reactionary backlash
was always a factor in the policy decisions of the Bhutto regime.6
3 s
In spite of his attempt to appease the religious lobby and at the same
time adopt progressive policies towards women (as was internationally
en vogue at the time), 64 Bhutto failed to maintain the balance.30
356. See Jalal, supra note 344, at 94 (deeming Ordinance "improvement" over Muslim
Marriage Dissolution Act of 1939).
357. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 9596 (noting that Pakistani women's movement sought to
convince State not to repeal Ordinance while State was under pressure from orthodox elements
to repeal).
358. SeeWOMEN OF PAKuSTAN: Two STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BAcK? 10-13 (Khawar Mumtaz
& Farida Shaheed eds., 1987) [hereinafter WOMEN OF PAKISTAN] (documenting social tensions
as result of loss of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and resulting discontent arising from Ayub
Khan regime's reforms leading eventually to regime's downfall).
359. See ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 100 (suggesting that Bhutto's opposition used Islam to
destabilize his regime).
360. Jalal, supra note 344, at 97.
361. Jalal, supra note 344, at 97.
362. See Jalal, supra note 344, at 97 (noting that common conceptions of Bhutto as
progressive rendered it politically difficult for him to attempt reforms in area of women's rights
for fear of alienating rural-urban migrants, laborers, and other growing classes with conservative
tendencies).
363. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 97-98 (referring to "paranoias" of leaders that Islamic
revivalist elements were weaving union of lower-middle classes and some segments of upper class
by attributing country's problems to "the state's lack of Islamic morality").
364. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 99 (noting that between 1973 and 1975, "'International
Women's Year,'" series of "polite nods" were made to cause of gender equality). In spite of the
characterization that his changes were inconsequential, Bhutto accomplished many substantial
reforms, such as: administrative reforms enabling women tojoin the upper echelons of the civil
service; drafting of a new Constitution professing commitment to equality among all citizens,
prohibiting discrimination on the sole basis of sex, undertaking the commitment to expand
participation of women in national life and providing for maternity benefits to working women;
the adoption by the National Assembly, which was dominated by Bhutto's followers, of a
declaration on women's rights seeking to improve the "social, economic and legal status" of
women in commemoration of the Women's Year, and the appointment of a Commission on
Women's Rights that presented a report in 1976 bemoaning the lack of progress in implement-
ing the Family Law Ordinance of 1961 and recommending changes and reforms. Id.
Notwithstanding this apparent progress in the arena of women's rights, the changes have been
dismissed as "bottles of ink spilt on women's issues" and "symbolic gestures." Id. at 100.
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Among the reasons for Bhutto's overthrow was the increased, albeit
still meager, participation of women in activities outside the
home." Thus Islamic sensibilities were exploited by Bhutto's
opposition by appealing to the need to reclaim women's honor by
restoring women to the sanctity of the home. Once again Islam was
used as a tool to destabilize a regime.
sw
The new military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq, took advantage of
Islamic consciousness in the aftermath of Bhutto's reign.' General
Zia, undertaking a general program of Islamization, focused his efforts
primarily on women and ensured that they lived within the bounds of
perceived decency.69 This campaign invoked the popular symbols
of chador (the veil) and chardivari (the four valls of the home).370
Zia's reign was also characterized by the selective literalist applica-
tion of certain provisions of the Shari'a in the form of the Hudood
Ordinance of 1979"~' and the reform of the Family Laws Ordinance
of 1961.11 Specifically, the Islamic Ideology Council, a governmen-
tal advisory board, contended that several provisions of the Family
Laws Ordinance, mainly those that improved the status quo of
women, were un-Islamic'S
365. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 100 (suggesting that even unsubstantiated veneer ofadvances
in women's rights served to fuel fire of forces using Islam as political weapon); supra note 347
(describing howJinnah's regime attempted to achieve balance between women's rights and
Islam).
366. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 100 (describing Islamic sensibility's disdain for women's
activities outside home and preference for returning women to 'four walls of the home'").
367. SeeEsPOsrro, supra note 120, at 100 (discussing re-emergence of Islam in politics, its use
by opposition forces in building coalition against Bhutto, and by Bhuto's successor, Zia, in
order to legitimate his rule); se also supra notes 351-58 and accompanying text (discussing defeat
ofAyub Khan regime that passed Family Law Ordinance consisting of reforms improving status
of women).
368. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 100-01 (characterizing Zia as "wily social tactician" who
correctly forecasted that controlling progress of women under guise of folloing Islamic dictates
would win his regime legitimacy).
369. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 100 (noting that Zia's platform, which stressed preserving
sanctity of home and veil, appealed to sentiments of broad cross-section of Pakistani society).
370. Seejalal, supra note 344, at 100-01 (describing Zia's ambition to return Pakistan to
.moral purity of early Islam").
371. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 829.
372. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 100 (stating that Zia appealed to Islamic ideologies to
justify his rule and appointed Islaraic Ideology Council for, among other reasons, revision of
Family Laws Ordinance);Jalal, supm note 344, at 101-02 (noting that Zia's mandates provided
for"medieval" punitive measures for various offenses such as death by stoning or 100 lashes for
both men and women in cases of adultery and rape).
373. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 100 (noting that Ordinance's mandate that notice be
served in event of divorce and permission be obtained for husband's proposed second marriage
lack Islamic sanction). The case was made by opponents of the reforms that provisions of the
Ordinance lacked Islamic sanction; however, this argument assumes that simply because the
Qur'an does not specifically approve of a practice, it is un-Islamic. Se id. at 97 (stating that
reforms were based on lack of conflict with primary sources of Islamic law, namely Qur'an and
Sunna).
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The Hudood Ordinance of 1979 required that evidentiary showings
and punishments "for the crimes of rape, adultery and fornication,
armed robbery, the use of alcohol and narcotics and false accusations
of adultery" 374 follow the Islamic standard.375  The evidentiary
requirements mandated by this standard included, in the case of
adultery, confession or the testimony of four Muslim males of good
moral standing to implicate the accused parties.3 76 This same
standard, however, was applied to the case of rape (zina-bil-jabr) under
the Ordinance, thus "effectively blurr[ing] the distinction between
rape and adultery."7 7 Without a confession, four Muslim men must
also witness and testify to a rape to satisfy the evidentiary require-
ments of this crime. 8 An insidious effect of this disturbing feature
of the new law was the fact that women reporting rape crimes could
now be prosecuted under adultery laws if male corroboration or
confession was not forthcoming.
3 79
The punishment for adultery under the hudood laws was stoning to
death or 100 lashes.' In the absence of the requisite evidence
involving four male eyewitness accounts of actual penetration, the
hudood penalties of lashing or stoning to death are supplanted with
tazir punishments, established at the discretion of the state,"1 which
can consist of flogging, imprisonment, a fine, or a combination of
these three.
8
Tazir punishments overwhelmingly affect women, as illustrated by
the infamous case of Safia Bibi v. State.Y A blind girl charged her
employer with rape but she was convicted of adultery and sentenced
to fifteen lashes, three years of imprisonment, and a fine based on
374. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 829.
375. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 830 & n.88 (noting that evidentiary requirements and
penalties of Ordinance were considered consistent with Islamic jurisprudence).
376. Jalal, supra note 344, at 102; se also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 830 (pointing out that
testimony of women is not recognized for purposes of imposing hudood punishment).
377. Jalal, supra note 344, at 102.
378. Jalal, supra note 344, at 102 (demonstrating lack of distinction in Hudood Ordinance's
evidentiary requirements between extramarital sex and rape); see also Sullivan, supra note 3, at
829 (noting that relevant provisions were to be found in The Offence of Zina (Enforcement of
Hudood) Ordinance of 1979).
379. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 829-30 (discussing possibility that woman alleging rape may
be punished as adulterer if her lack of consent is not conclusively established).
380. Jalal, supra note 344, at 102 (noting that, under Ordinance, women and men are subject
to equal punishment).
381. Evan Gottesman, The Reemergence of Qisas and Diyat in Pakistan, 23 COLUJM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 433,444-45 (1991-92) (noting that tazirpunishments involvejudicial discretion and are
not Qur'anic prescriptions).
382. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 830 (stating that victim's testimony may suffice to convict
rape suspect for purposes of latir punishment, provided, however, that there is corroborating
evidence of medical documentation or if victim's testimony "inspires confidence").
383. 1985 P.L.D. 120 (F.S.C.) (Pak.).
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her subsequent pregnancy' As a result of the protest in response
to the decision, the Federal Shariat Court was forced to exculpate the
girl. In other cases, women lodging rape complaints have actually
received tazir punishments for supposed adultery.' 5
The examination of Pakistan's experience with Islamic Thmily law
and its reform reveals that Islam has served as a "proven bulwark
against left-leaning tendencies," ' and was often successfully wielded
as a political tool to destabilize regimes. Even in present-day
Pakistan, political struggles for power are colored by the religion
issue, with different sides accusing each other of inauthenticity
With the exception of the Family Laws Ordinance in 1961, promulgat-
ed under the Ayub regime,'90 reforms, or the lack thereof, in family
law have largely been the measured product of both domestic and
international popular tides."9'
Fragile coalitions are often the reason for the ascendancy of any
regime,392 thus political leaders often have to appease a variety of
ideological views. 93 Regimes in power in Pakistan have had to deal
with the added factor of maintaining a "precarious balance " "S
between reformism, which would allow Pakistan to claim its rightful
384. See Safia Bibi v. State, 1985 P.LD. 120 (F.S.C.) (Pak.) (detailing charges and holding
in case).
385. See i;Jalal, supranote 344, at 102 (noting that, while Safta Bibidecision was overturned,
other rape victims have not been so lucky and have suffered toir punishments for supposed
adultery).
386. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 102 (discussing cases of two other Muslim women who were
sentenced to lashes for reporting rapes); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 831 n.95 (stating that
appealed rape convictions have resulted in women being convicted of dna (extamarital sex)
and sentenced to concomitant punishment).
387. Jalal, supra note 344, at 98.
388. See supra notes 347-51, 357-67 and accompanying text (discussing battle between
women's rights proponents and conservative Islamicsects duringJimnah, Ayub Khan, and Bhutto
regimes).
389. See Gottesman, supra note 381, at 44041 (documentingpolitics between Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto and opponent Nawaz Sharif during 1990 elections when Sharif, on many
occasions, accused Bhutto of impeding Islamization and Sharif's supporters tagged Bhutto's
policies as "offensive to Islam").
390. See supra notes 352-56 and accompanying text (stating that Ordinance ras first to
challenge traditional role of Pakistani women in family law area).
391. Seesupranotes 363-70 and accompanying text (discussing practice of Bhutto's opposition
of appealing to conservative portions of society by invoking traditional Islamic notions of
women).
392. SeeJalal, supra note 344, at 98 (reasoning that Zia was able to build consensus among
disparate elements ofsociety, such as amonglower-middle, middle, and upper classes, by playing
Islamic card).
393. See supra notes 363-65 and accompanying text (discussing problem of moUifing both
progressives and conservatives in area of women's rights).
394. See supra note 365 and accompanying text (describing Bhutto regime's failure to
maintain balance between women's rights and Islam).
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place among the community of nations, 95 and traditionalism, which
appealed to large segments of the Pakistani populace. 96 Incumbent
leaders and their political opponents alike would often resort to faulty
interpretations of religious law" for the expedient purposes of
achieving social and political legitimacy."' This point presents the
question of whether such manifestations of religion are protected
expressions of religious freedom."' It is unlikely that the Hudood
Ordinance would be considered among the guaranteed protections,
primarily because restrictions on religious law are permissible where
women's human rights and fundamental freedoms are being
violated.4" As in the case of slavery, which is religiously permissible
but reprehensible in practice,401 subjecting rape victims to flogging
for adultery is likely a situation where peremptory human rights
norms govern freedom of religion. °2 Moreover, the authenticity of
the evidentiary requirements under the Hudood Ordinance are
considered questionable. 4 3 Finally, many of the judgments ob-
tained under Shari'a law are not in fact applications of the Shari'a but
products of subjective judicial interpretation.4 4
395. See supra note 364 and accompanying text (characterizing as token, rights given to
Pakistani women in "International Women's Year").
396. See WOMEN OF PAKISTAN, supra note 358, at 14 (discussing widespread opposition from
political right to Bhutto regime and demands for greater implementation of Islamic policies).
397. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 100-01 (recognizing that interpretation of Islamic law
in Pakistan and Egypt has not always been "positively rooted in Islamic values" but was justiflet
by pointing to lack of conflict with Qur'anic prescriptions); see also supra notes 376-79 and
accompanying text (discussing evidentiary standards for rape and adultery under Hudood
Ordinance).
398. Seesupranotes 368-73 and accompanying text (outlining Zia's use of Islam to strengthen
his regime).
399. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 813 (noting that "extent to which a... particular practice
is deemed to have a legitimate foundation in religious law, does not determine whether
international guarantees of freedom are applicable"). Sullivan comments that all manifestations
of religion, unless "spurious or fraudulent," are protected by international guarantees of
religious freedom such as those in the Declaration on Religious Intolerance, Id. at 813, 815,
It is unlikely that the Hudood Ordinance could be considered fraudulent, given their bases In
Islamic law. See supra notes 375-78 and accompanying text (noting Islamic justification
underlying Hudood Ordinance).
400. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 810-11 (maintaining that religious law may be restricted where
women's human rights are being violated).
401. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 811 (pointing to international consensus on abolition of slavery
and other such practices permitted by religious traditions).
402. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 818-19 (discussing minimum standards of human rights, such
as prohibition on slavery and infliction of physical or mental torture, as circumscribing practice
of religion).
403. See WOMEN OF PAKMsTAN, supra note 358, at 100-01 (maintaining that Qur'anlc
evidentiary requirements require as witnesses "'four believers from amongst you,'" not four male
eyewitnesses).
404. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 100 (stating that courts in Pakistan have utilized
questionable form of Yt/had, or interpretation, in arriving at theirjudgments).
The impact ofjudicial interpretation of Islamic law, but with an outcome more favorable to
women, may be illustrated even more dramatically with reference to the Shah Bano case that
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This discussion of Pakistan suggests that religious justification for
suppressing women's rights must be critically examined by adherents
of the religion themselves. The purpose behind the imposition of
hudood laws with their disproportionate impact on women is rendered
suspect given the history of politicizing Islam in the Pakistani context:
"The obvious objective of these measures was to give legitimacy to a
transpired in India, Pakistan's neighbor. Se Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum,
A.I.I. 1985, S.C. 945, reprinted in THE SHAH BANO CONTROVERSY23, 23 (AsgharAii Engineer ed.,
1987) [hereinafter SHAH BANo CoNTROVEsY]. In this case, an elderly Muslim woman, Shah
Bano Begum, was driven from her marital home by her husband of 43 years. Id. Subsequently,
Shah Bano filed a court petition for maintenance from her husband, Mohammad Ahmed Khan,
who divorced her by unilateral taaq months later. Id. Khan maintained that under Muslim
Personal Law, which Muslims have the option of choosing to follow in India, he had already
provided Shah Bano with the requisite maintenance. See id.; c LATEEF, supra note 344. at 163
(describing application of Muslim Personal Law in India, which provides Muslim men option
of obtaining unilateral divorce). After consistent lower courtjudgments in favor of the plaintiff
wife, Shah Bano, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of India. Sw SHAH DANO
CoNTRov.Rsy, supra, at 23. In a scathing judgment criticizing various aspects of Muslim law as
it is practiced, the 1985 Supreme Court opinion, written by the Hindu ChiefJustice, stated that
Muslim law must be interpreted in light of its entirety. IL at 27-28. The Court then purported
to interpret the Qur'an to require that a Muslim husband should provide maintenance to a
divorced wife. IX at 30. While this interpretation of the Qur'an may have had its supporters
as well as detractors among Muslims, the very fact that the Court attempted to interpret the
Qur'an offended the sensibilities of a large section of the Muslim community and public outcry
resulted. SweIATEEF, supra note 344, at 193-94. In reaction to pressure from the religious lobby,
the Rajiv Gandhi governmentsuccessfUlly introduced the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights
on Divorce) Act of 1986. Sez Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill of 1936,
reprinted in THE SHAH BANO CONTROVERSv, supra, at 85, 85-88; see aso Amria Chhachhi, Forced
Identities. The State, Gommunalism, Fundamentalism and Women in India, in WOMEN, ISLAM & THE
STATE, supra note 326, at 144, 146 (noting that Bill was passed by Indian Parliament in 1936,
hence becomingAct); Kuldip Nayar, Separate Pemonal Laws Do Not Diltute Smdaris in THE SHAH
BANO CONTROVEP, supra, at 116,117 (suggesting that then-Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi hastily
introduced Bill).
The main provision of the Act stated:
[A] divorced woman shall be entitled to.. . a reasonable and fair provision and
maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period ry her former
husband.
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill of 1986, supra, § 3(1)(a), at 85. Under
the Act, the iddat period is defined as "three menstrual courses," "three lunar months," or, in
the case of pregnant women, "the period between the divorce and the delivery of her child or
the termination of her pregnancy, whichever is earlier." Id. § 2(b)(i)-(iii), at 85. The Act was
viewed as governmental capitulation to conservative Muslim pressure. Se LATE , supra note
344, at 194 (stating that Government "yield(ed] to conservative pressure"); Nilkhl Chakravartty,
Secularism Segregated in RajiVus India, in THE SHAH BANO COmOVEsy, supra, at 118, 119
(proposing that Act"puts the divorced Muslim woman in the category ofa second-class citizen").
The Act was seen as making a "mockery of protecting women." LATE, supra note 344, at 195.
However, localjudidal applications of the Act belied its initial interpretation. For example,
in the Kerala state cases of Al v. Sufaira, 1988 (2) K.LT. 94, Aliyar v. Pathu, 1988 (2) K.LT.
446, and Ahammed v. Aysha, 1990 (1) 1.LT. 172, the Act was interpreted so as to separate the
word "provision," from the word "maintenance," so that while maintenance was to be provided
during the iddat period, provision encompassed a divorced woman's needs in the longer term.
See Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill of 1936, supra, at 85; w also Ali v.
Sufaira, 1988 (2) K.ILT. 94, 94; Aliyar v. Pathu, 1988 (2) K.LT. 446, 447; Ahammed v. A)sha,
1990 (1) KL.T. 172, 175. Thus, court interpretations of seemingly oppressive personal laws have
effected reforms in the condition of Muslim women in India. SeAli v. Sufaim, 1988 (2) I-T.
94,94; Aliyar v. Pathu, 1988 (2) .LIT. 446,447; Ahammed v. Aysha, 1990 (1) K.LT. 172, 175.
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government... ."405 Equally questionable are tazir punishments
that are established at the discretion of the state.06 Pakistan's
experience thus represents the counterpoint to that of a nation like
Tunisia, where traditional Islamic teachings were adopted to achieve
socially progressive ends.4°' By contrast, in Pakistan, Islam has been
manipulated to result in socially regressive legislation for politically
expedient purposes.4°
E. Conclusion of Selected States Section
This summary of Shari'a as practiced in family law contexts of
Muslims in various countries brings to light several important points.
First, a number of reform methodologies are available to update
Shari'a law.4°  In many cases, however, the reform techniques are
applied in inconsistent or Islamically unsanctioned ways.410 Drawing
upon Qur'anic language to effectuate change is another effective
reform methodology, as exemplified by Tunisia's attempt to abolish
long-accepted practices such as polygamy and talaq.41 According to
some schools of thought, however, such reforms may be of question-
able legitimacy, given that classical Islamic law does not allow for
405. See WOMEN OF PAKISTAN, supra note 358, at 17.
406. See Gottesman, supra note 381, at 444-45 (discussing discretionary nature of lazir
punishments, both in terms of their institution by State and their interpretation byjudilary).
407. See supra Part IIH.B (outlining Tunisian reforms that were achieved within Islamlcally
permissible means).
408. See WOMEN OF PAKISTAN, supra note 358, at 17. Pakistani women's advocates have
suggested that the emergence of regressive interpretations of Islam has contributed to the lack
of progress of the country.
The only version of Islam that has developed and flourished at all is conservative,
bigoted and fanatical, and it is from this that the emerging elites attempt to derive
their philosophical bearings. In the absence of any serious work towards progressive
interpretations of religion, of distinguishing between its spirit and symbols, Pakistan
seems to be in the grip of the unenlightened and the closed-minded. And since the
political process has been subverted, the masses, whose belief may be Islam, but whose
concern is not religion but the real issues of existence, have been by-passed.
Id.
409. See, eg., supra notes 241-56, 299-301 and accompanying text (discussing reform
methodologies). Abdullahi An-Na'im summarizes these methodologies as takhayyur (selection
of opinions from a school of Islamic jurisprudence), of which talfiq (patching together) Is a
component; a form of Qur'anic reinterpretation whereby certain Qur'anic requirements were
used to nullify or restrict perceived rights (such as polygamy); syasa shariya (or slyassa sharila),
whereby a ruler was given the power to implement rules in order to advance the Shari'a; and
judicial reform through case law in former British colonies such as India. SeAN-NA'IM, supra
note 131, at 45-46 (proposing that methodologies provide only "temporary and insufficient
relief"); see also supra note 148 and accompanying text (examining possibility of re-activating
naskh, or abrogation and repeal of certain Islamic mandates, to achieve reform).
410. See supra notes 376-78, 398-99 and accompanying text (discussing manipulation of Islam
to support repressive practices).
411. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (discussing Qur'an's treatment of
polygamy).
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human interpretation of the divinely acquired Shatiia.412 Other
reform methodologies, such as siyassa shadia, have been selectively
marshaled and have not been effectively invoked to justify progressive
legal changes.418
Second, societal conditions and opinions favoring or opposing
progressive reforms have significantly impacted the evolution of
Muslim personal law in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Pakistan, and
India." 4 Riding the crest of popular opinion has also politicized
Islam and utilized it as an expedient tool when there were power
struggles.
415
Third, the foregoing discussion suggests that there is a lacuna
between what the Shari'a says and how it is practiced. The lack of an
authoritative code of Shari'a, given the various schools and sub-sects
within Islam,416 combined with the adulterated, politicized version
of Islamic law in force in various countries today,4 17 further frus-
trates the objective of achieving a nexus between the Shaii'a and
women's progress.
The divinity of the Shari'a has been called into question by
some.418  The reason given for this view is that a divinely attained
law, so diluted by human interpretation, must have lost its divine
character.419 A question arises as to whether existing systems of
Shari'a can be sustained, or whether the entire framework needs to be
overhauled 2 Some have advocated a return to original precepts
of Shar'a, such as qjtihad (interpretation),"' while others have
suggested devising a system of laws based on current needs. '
412. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (noting Islamic prohibition of secular law
reform).
413. Seesupra text accompanying notes 332-33 (identiyingsisya.sahad'aas doctrine allowing
reform at discretion of ruler).
414. Swe supra notes 268, 272, 277, 327-36, 357-70, 404 and accompanying text (giving
examples of effect of popular movements on reforms in marious countries).
415. Sesupra notes 359-73,388-98 and accompanying text (describing politicization ofIslam
as tool of power to stem reform and destabilize progressive regimes).
416. See supra Part H.B (discussing various schools of Islamic law).
417. See supra Part I1 (explaining diversity of application of Shariia).
418. SeeAN-NA'XM, supra note 131, at 185-86 (maintaining that, while Sharia is extracted from
divine sources, it is not divine in and of itself).
419. SeAN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 185 (proposing that Slai'a is not divine "because it is
the product of human inteprdation of those sources").
420. SeeAN-NA'IM, supra note 131, at 186 (stressing that Shaii, in context of public lart, was
time-specific construct and that present-day Muslims should customize religious law for
contemporary application).
421. See EsposITO, supra note 120. at 103-05, 116-22 (advocating rejection of taqlid, or
following past precedent, in favor ofg"tiau, closure ofwitich has been regarded as'pure fiction"
by modernist scholars, and recommending revisitation of processes of qias, or analogical
reasoning, and ifna, or consensus).
422. Seesupra note 420 and accompanying text (suggesting contemporization ofIslamic laws).
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There is, however, no guarantee that a new system of Islamic laws,
which in itself would seem difficult to achieve, would be any less
subject to political vagaries and misinterpretation than the existing
Shari'a.4 3 Given that present-day Shari'a has already been exposed
to human interpretations,424 divinity would not be lost in identifying,
exposing, and correcting the inconsistencies and misapplications of
it. The process of naskh, or repeal of Islamic prescriptions that may
conflict with the larger ideals of the Qur'an and the Sunna, has been
identified as a potential mechanism for effecting reform in place of
ijtihad.4  Ultimately, the evolution of the Shari'a over time suggests
that it is a living law and not inflexible as opponents of reform have
painted it.
426
IV. CULTURAL BIASES WrrHIN THE WOMEN'S CONVENTION
Reform of Shari'a law represents only half of the equation with
respect to compliance with the Women's Convention. The Conven-
tion itself must be examined for potential biases that preclude its
universal adoption. This section will focus on the Convention itself
and determine whether provisions of the Convention are workable
and desirable, or self-defeating, within an Islamic context.
The existence of cultural conflict between the Women's Convention
and several of its States Parties is illustrated by the nature of the
reservations made to the Convention.41 Article 16, for example,
which mandates the elimination of discrimination against women in
the area of marriage and family,42' has been the subject of reserva.
tions by Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey.429 Tie
reservations have been based, for the most part, on provisions of the
423. See supra text accompanying notes 410-15 (discussing subjective interpretation and
politicization of Shari'a).
424. See supra notes 418-19 and accompanying text (noting dilution by human interpretation
of divinity of Shawia).
425. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing process of naskh and its utility as
possible reform mechanism for achieving reform within Islamically permissible means).
426. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to family law reform
in Pakistan based on argument that reforms favoring women lacked Islamic sanction).
427. SeeALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 10, 121-23, 130-34 (reproducing text
of Shadi'a-based reservations of various Islamic nations to Articles 2, 15, and 16 of Women's
Convention, which provide that Articles will be adhered to only so long as they do not conflict
with Shai'a). Only Egypt provides more insight into the conflicts between the Shari'a and
Article 16 of the Women's Convention in pointing out the distinction between the Islamic
concept of "equitability" in marriage and family relations and the Convention's concept of
.equality." ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 131.
428. See Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16, at 196.
429. SeeALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 130-34 (setting out text of reservations
entered by Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey).
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Islamic Shafi'a.Y' Sources of negotiating history of the Article reveal
no discussion on the implications of the Article for religious practic-
es. 43
The most recent United Nations Report of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women provides commentary
on Article 16 and its applicability to States Parties. The commen-
tary condemns arranged marriages involving payment or prefer-
ment.1- 3 This condemnation may be short-sighted in the context of
Muslim marriages. The payment of mahr (dower), which involves
payment or preferment, is a central feature of the marriage contract
in Islan l and, as a measure "intended to safeguard [a woman's]
economic position after marriage," s it may not be considered
anathema to the Women's Convention, if correctly practiced.'
Given that Islamic law requires mahr to be offered to a bride and not
to her relations, the practice of mahrin Islamic marriages "could not
be considered a sale."
4 7
The commentary of the Commission also presupposes that arranged
marriages do not involve choice.' While marriages may be custom-
arily arranged in Islam, 9 Muslim law recognizes the legal capacity
of post-pubescent males and females to contract their own marriag-
es.' 0 Moreover, given that marriage is regarded as a sacred con-
tract under Islam," 1 offer and acceptance of the contracting parties
430. See ALL APPROPRIATE MEAsURES, supra note 10, at 130-32 (reproducing text of
Bangladesh's, Egypt's, and Iraq's reservations to Article 16, with Shada cited as main reason for
reserving right not to accede to Article).
431. See ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 12930 (purporting to summarize
"[two central issues" that arose in negotiations ofArtide 16, namely, parenting rights of'single
parents and property rights based onjoint or sole ownership status with no mention of religious
implications).
432. CEDAWRepot, supra note 7,11 11-50, at 3-10. The Committee cas established pursuant
to Part V (Articles 17-22) of the Women's Convention for the purpose of overseeing the
implementation of its provisions. SeeWomen's Convention, supra note 1, arts. 17-22.
433. See CEDAWRepoi, supra note 7,1 16, at 4 (suggesting that arranged marriages involving
payment or preferment deny women right to "enter freely into marriage").
434. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 24 (stating that mahris indispensable part of marriage
formalities).
435. EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 24.
436. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 24 (stating that dower is paid to bride herself, not her
father, as was case in pre-Islamic Arabia).
437. EsPOSrTO, supra note 120, at 24.
438. See CF.DAW Repor, supra note 7, 1 16, at 4 (inferring that women's right to choose
spouse is precluded in arranged marriage process).
439. See LATEEF, supra note 344, at 163-69 (acknowledging existence of arranged marriages
in Islam); see alsoVanessa Maher, Women and Soda! Change in Mo.Ao, in WOMEN IN THE MUSLIM
WORLD, supra note 205, at 100, 113 (discussing role of women in arranging marriages).
440. See ESPosrro, supra note 120, at 16 (stating that, in Islam, age ofpuberty is age at which
males and females can contract marriages on behalf of themselves or others).
441. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 16 (defining marriage as "highly religious sacred
covenant").
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is a central feature of the marriage process."4 Upon reaching
puberty, with the right to contract marriage came the concomitant
power to reject a marriage contract.4" Moreover, under Hanafi law,
full rights to marry were only recognized upon having reached
puberty, i.e., when the parties concerned have the right to contract
for themselves.4' Further, the free consent of both parties is
essential to the Islamic marriage contract.4' Thus, while practical
realities may bespeak otherwise,4"6 countries "allow[ing] a woman's
marriage to be arranged for payment or preferment"447 do not
necessarily violate the spirit of the Women's Convention, given the
underlying purpose of mahr and the consensual nature of marriages
that seem "arranged" in Islam.
The Committee commented further that, where "the betrothal of
girls or undertakings by family members on their behalf is permit-
ted,"4' a woman's right to freely choose her partner is contra-
vened.449 This comment falls to recognize that, at least in the
Islamic context, boys and girls are equally subject to such arrange-
ments,4  thus both partners' rights are equally contravened. 5
Such arrangements, while objectionable, are not gender-specific and
are thus not indicative of gender discrimination.
452
The commentary on Article 16 also assumes that a woman's right
to enter freely into marriage is circumscribed where her intended
442. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 16 (noting that offer (y"ab) and acceptance (gabul) are
essential to marriage).
443. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 17 (stating that "option of puberty" involved
repudiation by either party upon reaching puberty of marriage contracted in fraud or
negligence). The option of puberty, while bestowing rights equally on males and females,
cannot be exercised if the contracting was done by the parties' fathers or grandfathers. Id.
"However, this regulation is not supported by any Quranic prescription or Sunnah of the
Prophet." It.
444. See HODKINSON, supra note 11, at 92 (stating that, among other things, under Hanafi
law, full capacity to marry was contingent upon having attained puberty).
445. HODYUNSON, supra note 11, at 91; see also Zarina Bhatty, Muslim Women in Uttar Pradikh
Social Mobility and Directions of Change, in WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA 199,
202 (Alfred de Souza ed., 1980) (quoting Qur'an as saying that woman will not be married by
force in absence of her consent).
446. See Bhatty, supra note 445, at 202 (discussing example of Ashraf Muslims of Uttar
Pradesh, India among whom girl's consent is immaterial, and moreover, actual expressed
preference is "scandalous").
447. CFDAW Report, supra note 7, 16, at 4.
448. CEDAWRepor, supra note 7, 1 38, at 8.
449. CEDAWReport, supra note 7, 38, at 8.
450. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 17 (stating that marriages contracted on behalf of
minors by third parties may be repudiated "when he or she attains puberty") (emphasis added).
451. See CF.DAWReport, supra note 7,1 38, at 8.
452. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
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partner is a consanguine. 3 The reality among many Muslims,
however, is that certain blood relatives may marry.P The Report
fails to articulate a reason for a restriction on cousin-marriages, which
is an accepted practice in many segments of non-Western society.
With respect to property ownership, the commentary on Article
16(1) (h) of the Convention labels as discriminatory "any la or
custom that grants men a right to a greater share of property... on
the death of a relative. " " When the representative of the Govern-
ment of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, for example, explained the
Islamic justification for a reduced share of inheritance for female
children, namely that "women acquire[] that part of the inheritance
without commitments, whereas men had to take over all the concomi-
tant obligations,"17 members of the Committee "felt that there was
no need to enter a reservation, because, with that interpretation,
women were treated equally with men."' Thus, according to the
Committee itself, "a greater share of property"59 for men is not in
all cases tantamount to inequality. The Women's Convention's
language, however, does not take this factor into account.
While the Committee on the Women's Convention appears to have
a somewhat informed view on the Szarila it does not adequately
recognize the reform and adaptability of Shari'a principles over time.
While the Shai'a is characterized as a static, 1500-year-old code,
461
the reality is that it is a living, amended, and adaptable lam" More
importantly, the Committee's views are not adequately reflected in the
453. See CEDA WReport, supra note 7,1 16, at 4 (stating that woman's right to chooze parmer
should be "[s)ubject to rasonable restrictions based, for example, on a %oman's youth or
consanguinity with her partner") (emphasis added).
454. See CFDAWReport supra note 7,1 170, at 44 (mentioning that marriages between dose
relatives other than man and his mother, sister, niece, or aunt are permitted in Libya); Michael
MJ. Fischer, On Changing the Conapt and Position of Pmeian Woen, in WOIEN IN THE MUSLIM
WORLD, supra note 205, at 189, 197 (discussing preference for parallel cousin marriages in
certain regions of Middle East).
455. SeeLATEEF, supra note 344, at 165 (discussing women's inheritance rights in marriages
arranged between cousins); Andrea Menefee Singh, The Study of WMham in South Asia: Sorze
Current MAehodoiogial and Researd Issues, in WOMEN IN CONMWPORARY INDIA AND SOTrrH AsIA,
supra note 445, at 61, 83 (referring to acceptance of cousin-marriages).
456. CEDAWReport, supra note 7, 1 28, at 6.
457. CEDAWRepor, supra note 7,1 174, at 44.
458. CEDAWRPv supra note 7, 1 174, at 44.
459. CEDAWRepw4 supra note 7, 28, at 6.
460. See Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(h), at 196 (mandating same property
rights for both spouses).
461. See CEDAWRepArt supra note 7,1 132, at 39 (suggesting that Shari'a has remained static
and recommending jtihad in order to update Sari'a).
462. Sre supra Part III (discussing diversity of application of Sharida); s aLso Pr note 148
and accompanying text (pointing out adaptability of reform mechanism of nakf to modern
context).
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language of the treaty,4' as illustrated by the example of propor-
tional property inheritance.4"
Another area in which the Convention's provisions are culturally
insensitive is its espousal of coeducation.4  This objective does not
take into account the possibility that compulsory coeducation could
have an undesirable effect on the goal of women's equality by
motivating some parents, especially in milieus where strict purdah
(separation of the sexes and veiling of women) is observed,416 to
pull their daughters out of school to enforce gender separation.
46 7
The coeducation recommendation illustrates that neglecting the
varying cultural and religious circumstances of women may be a
self-defeating feature of the Convention.
Criticism of the Women's Convention has been aimed at the
cultural hegemony of Western ideals embodied within the Conven-
tion. The Islamic concept of "equitability," which emphasizes the
complementary but equally important roles of men and women,
rather than "equality" in the objective sense, is an example of the
differing concepts of parity in different societies."' Egypt artfully
utilizes Article 23 of the Convention, which allows for States Parties to
apply their own legislative measures when "more conducive to the
463. See supra text accompanying notes 456-60 (noting failure of Convention language to
acknowledge Committee's standard for equality of inheritance rights).
464. See supra text accompanying note 457 (outlining Islamic interpretation of equality of
inheritance rights which depends on obligations accompanying inheritance).
465. See Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 10(c), at 195.
466. See Ursula M. Sharma, Purdah and Public Space in WOMEN IN CONTUMPO.ARY INDIA AND
SouTH ASIA, supra note 445, at 213, 213-14 (defining purdah as "those rules which govern the
behavior of married women towards male affines and neighbours... ; those norms which define
the separation of the sexes... ; [and/or] those norms which govern women's mobility, and
even visibility, outside the home"). It is important to note that, while purdah can be regarded
as exclusionary, it is regarded by some as empowering. See id. at 215; see also Deniz Handiyot,
Introduction to WOMEN, ISLAM, & THE STATE, supra note 326, at 1, 18 (suggesting that veiled
woman in public space may be "'formidable'"); Keddie & Beck, supra note 205, at 9 (noting that
veiling suggested economic empowerment and nationalistic reaction against imposition of
colonial customs).
467. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 815 & n.48 (stating that it is internationally recognized
prerogative of parents to have their children educated in conformance with their own religious
convictions).
468. See North American Muslim Women's Retreat and Dialogue on the Document: "The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,"
Looking at Human Rights, Document I, at 2 (draft 1994) (on file with The American University
Law Review) [hereinafter Looking at Human Rights] (maintaining that Women's Convention
reflects Western and Christian principles of "equality" without regard for Islamic counterpart of
"equitability" and ultimately recommending that United States not ratify Convention), see also
ALLAPPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 131 (duplicating text of Egypt's reservation, which
stresses concept of equalitability in marriage, or complementary rights of women and men, to
Article 16 of Women's Convention);Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 227 (illustrating distinction drawn
by Egypt between Islamic and Western concepts of equality); supa text accompanying note 94
(providing partial text of Egyptian reservation to Article 16).
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achievement of equality between men and women."46 The Egyptian
reservation to Article 16 draws upon the principles of Article 23 by
maintaining that, in marital relations, "equivalency of rights and
duties so as to ensure complementarity ... guarantees true equali-
ty" 4 ° according to Islamic religious beliefs.4 ' The distinction
between "equality," as mandated in the Women's Convention,47 and
"equivalency" or "equitability," as defined by proponents of the
Islamic standard,473 is underscored by the contention that the
Women's Convention defines women's rights in terms of men and
does not regard the complementarity of roles betveen men and
women as a facet of equality.74
Given the foregoing discussion, it is arguable that a certain amount
of cultural relativity is appropriate in enforcement of the Women's
Convention.7" While some language in the Convention may
potentially defeat the purpose of women's equality if unmodified and
enforced,476 other provisions simply fail to consider the diversity of
culture-specific or culturally favored definitions of equality, and the
practicability or even desirability of implementation.
4 rt
A more workable, albeit less ambitious, instrument of change would
take into consideration the day-to-day realities of women who need
change the most For example, in Uttar Pradesh, India, Ashraf
Muslim females are culturally forbidden from expressing a preference
469. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 23, at 197; =e alsoJenefsky, supra note 2, at 227
(promoting Article 23 as provision allowing States Parties to apply their own laws if appropriate
to cause of women's equality).
470. ALL APPROPRIATE MFASURES, .mpa note 10, at 131.
471. SeeALLAPPROPRATE MEASURES. supra note 10, at 131 (noting that'quasi-equality" is in
reality burden on wives); Jenefsky, supra note 2, at 227-28 (recognizing Egypt's indirect
invocation of Article 23 to reserve right to accede to Article 16); supra text accompanying note
94 (suggesting that Islamic Shadi'a is arbiter of equitability).
472. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 23.
473. ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES, supra note 10, at 131 (provding text ofEg)p's resenration
to Article 16 and asserting that reservation is based on Islamic standard of complementarity
between women and men); Looking at Human Rights, supra note 468, at 2 (advocating Islamic
ideal of equitability that envisions complementary roles of women and men over Women's
Convention's ideal of equality, which is defined by male standard).
474. SeeLooking at Human Rights, supra note 468, at 2 (declaring that Women's Convention
does not recognize rights and responsibilities of women that differ from those of men).
475. Sre supra notes 427-74 (discussing difficulty of enforcing language of Women's
Convention on societies where imbedded cultural norms render provisions of Women's
Convention unworkable or regressive).
476. Seesupra notes 465-67 and accompanying text (discussing possible negative repercussions
of enforcing mandatory coeducation).
477. Seesupra notes 468-74 and accompanying text (noting that *equality" in application may
not be more desirable than "equitability and that this distinction is not acknowledged byi
Women's Convention, thereby rendering Convention unresponsive to cultural diversity).
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for a bridegroom.4 78 In such a society, freedom to choose a part-
ner, which is a goal of the Women's Convention, 79 may be a less
realistic goal than basic consent to the marriage,4 80 a principle
advocated by the Shari'a, and hence more likely familiar, or at least
practical. In this way, the objectives of the Convention need to be
customized to the everyday realities of those to whom they will
apply."' While such charges may be incremental, they also prevent
the hardship of social and cultural rejection that women may face in
certain settings if the Women's Convention is fully complied with.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The spirit of the Shari'a, at the time of its original enforcement, was
revolutionary in terms of the rights granted to women.8 2 Over
time, however, some of the revolutionary spirit of the Sharia has been
adulterated due to human misinterpretation and misuse.4" This
misuse has resulted in unacceptable conditions.
484
Just as provisions of the Women's Convention should be reformulat-
ed to adequately address the reality of diverse groups of women,
485
reservations to the Women's Convention should be narrowly tailored
to reflect specific conflicts between religious prescription and the
Women's Convention. 6 To this end, countries must be prepared
to examine the authenticity of those religious practices that allegedly
permit unequal treatment of women and the consistency of such
practices with other reforms undertaken by the State. A similar
478. See Bhatty, supra note 445, at 202 (discussing example of Ashraf Muslims In Uttar
Pradesh, India, where girl's consent is immaterial, and moreover, actual expressed preference
"scandalous").
479. See CEDAWReport, supra note 7, 1 16, at 4 ("A woman's right to choose a spouse and
enter freely into marriage is central to her life... dignity... and equality as a human being.").
480. See HODRINSON, supra note 11, at 91 (stating that freely given consent is essential to
marriage contract in Islam).
481. See supra notes 434-80 and accompanying text (outlining cultural practices in Islamic
countries that are unnecessarily affected by overbroad provisions of Women's Convention),
482. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 13 (stating that Qur'anic reforms "served to raise the
status of women" during period after revelation of Islam in seventh century A.D.).
483. See Esosrro, supra note 120, at 17 (noting that Islamic practice of disallowing
challenges to marriages contracted by fathers or grandfathers is not supported in Qur'an); supra
notes 368-86 and accompanying text (discussing politicization of Islam and misapplication of
traditional hudood and tazir punishments).
484. See Looking at Human Rights, supra note 468, at 2 (acknowledging "the deplorable
human rights conditions in the 'Muslim' countries," characterizing them as "un-Islamic" and
calling for "solutions and corrective measures that are compatible with Qur'anic directives and
in harmony with the Islamic wordview"). Criticism leveled at human rights abuses in Islamic
societies has attributed such violations to departure from Islamic values. See id.
485. See supra Part IV (discussing cultural biases within Women's Convention).
486, Vienna Declaration, supra note 108, 21 I.L.M. at 1673 (advocating that reservations be
formulated "as precisely and narrowly as possible" taking into account object and purpose of
treaty).
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suggestion was adopted and tabled by the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in the face of opposi-
tion by several countries.
A superficial comparison of the provisions of Article 16 with the
Shari'a as it is professed and practiced, suggests that certain countries
have formulated overbroad reservations. The first part of Article 16
requires that women and men have the same right to freely enter into
a consensual marital union.' This right exists in theory, but has
been tampered with in practice.' While authenticity of religious
practices is not considered in affording protection to manifestations
of religious belief,4"o " [ t]he question of authenticity does, of course,
have both strategic and substantive importance for those seeking to
reform religious law or practice alternative interpretations. " !
Inconsistency in reforms and selective marshaling of traditional
practices and revolutionary interpretations has resulted in an
incoherent body of Shari'a in several countries." - A more uniform
code of law can be achieved, it seems, through a process like that
initially undertaken in Bourguiba's Tunisia, where Qur'anic reasoning
provided a mechanism for reform through indigenous self-regula-
tion.493 This process, combined with sorting those provisions that
are merely tolerated by the Qur'an' from those actually pre-
scribed,4 95 might serve to phase out practices, such as polygamy and
487. Clark, supra note 13, at 287-88 (discussing CEDAW's suggestion that U.N. undertake
study on women living under Islamic law regimes with view toimrd discovering effect of such las,
on status of women in family and marital life and furtherstudy principle of f"tihadwithin Islam).
CEDAW's suggestion resulted in accusations that it was culturally and religiously imperialist. Id.
at 288. These accusations silenced the initiative. Id.
488. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1) (a)-(b), at 196.
489. See ESPOSITO, supra note 120, at 17 (noting that, while fathers and grandfathers of both
male and female minors have exclusive right to contract permanent, inalienable marriages on
behalf of their offspring, this right "is not supported by any Quranic prescription or Sunnah of
the Prophet"); supra notes 439-45 and accompanying text (discussing right of both females and
males to contract their own marriages, but not without exceptions).
490. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 813 (stating that international guarantees ofreligious freedom
apply whether particular religious practice is authoritative or aberrant).
491. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 813.
492. See supra Part Ifl (analyzing application of Shayia and its reform in Morocco, Tunisia
Egypt, and Pakistan).
493. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text (noting that while Tunisia utilized
innovative interpretations of Islamic law to reform law-s, reforms were nevertheless achieved
primarily through indigenous, Islamic means). The process of nazmh as a means of facilitating
reform has been discussed, see supra note 148.
494. SeeEsposrro, supra note 120, at 110-11 (arguing that Qur'anic ideal is monogamy and
characterizing husband's limitation to four wives as attempt at reforming previously unrestricted
polygamous practices). Thus, polygamy is merely a tolerated practice rather than aprescription.
See i4
495. The Qur'an IV:11, IV:12 (prescribing inheritance portions).
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nonconsensual marriages,496 which violate provisions of Article
16.41 Consistency with the Qur'an ensures, for example, that States
Parties' reservations to Article 16(1)(a)-(b) 491 would be unfound-ed499
Similarly, other features of Islamic law that are expressly governed
by Qur'anic prescription, such as inheritance, °° may be revised in
accordance with Qur'anic commentary, which suggests that the two-to-
one ratio accorded to men and women, respectively, may have been
imposed as a result of oversimplified interpretation of Qur'anic intent
by Islamic jurists."1 Thus, Qur'anic directives on inheritance have
served as the basis for several unnecessary reservations to Article 16
of the Women's Convention.
50 2
In matters of divorce, where several options are permissible under
Islamic law, adopting the teaching of the school of law most favorable
to women is a workable solution." 3 Adopting the Maliki school's
framework for granting judicially decreed divorces to women would
be one possible measure that States Parties could take in order to
begin achieving compliance with Article 16(c) of the Women's
496. Esposrro, supra note 120, at 17 (noting that although fathers and grandfathers contract
their children in marriage, without affording children opportunity to consent or repudiate
marriage, this is not Qur'anically sanctioned right).
497. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16 (a)-(c), at 196 (requiring that women and
men have equal rights to enter into marriage, freely choose marriage partner, exercise rights
and responsibilities during marriage, and dissolve marriage).
498. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(1)(a)-(b), at 196 (requiring that men and
women shall have same right to freely choose spouse and enter into consensual marriage).
499. See supra notes 438-52 and accompanying text (making argument that, under pure
Islamic law, unadulterated by customary practice, males and females had equal rights to enter
into consensual marriages).
500. SeeWADUD-MUHSIN, supra note 260, at 87 (enumerating two-to-one ratio of inheritance
accorded to men and women, respectively, under Islamic law and articulating that distribution
of inheritance requires equity, which is to be measured by actual benefit accruing to recipient
after obligations, such as family support, are met); supra note 495 and accompanying text (citing
to verse of Holy Qur'an governing inheritance after obligations, such as family, are met).
501. See WADuD-MuHst , supra note 260, at 87 (suggesting that Qur'anic discussions point
to several possibilities for dividing property and that Qur'anic verse prescribes that property
must be divided according to actual benefit accruing to heir after taking into consideration
heir's financial obligations, irrespective of whether heir is male or female). Wadud-Muhsn's
point suggests that whoever must bear the responsibility of supporting the family should receive
the higher proportion of inheritance according to the Qur'an, whether that individual is a man
or a woman. See iU
502. See CEDAWReport, supra note 7,1 174, at 144 (providing for permissibility of Libyan laws
on inheritance); Clark, supra note 13, at 300 (characterizing Iraq's property laws as more
favorable to women than Women's Convention and questioning incompatibility of Iraq's law
with Article 16); supra note 501 and accompanying text (noting that Qur'anic intent underlying
inheritance laws may have been nondiscriminatory but has been interpreted by Islamic jurists
as favoring men).
503. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (illustrating Morocco's adoption of
Hanbali tradition to restrict polygamy); see also sup notes 250, 301,318 and accompanying text
(documenting rationale for adopting Maliki ideology to implement more progressive divorce
reforms beneficial to women).
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Convention, which provides that women and men should have "[t] he
same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolu-
tion."'5 04
In short, because the Qur'an is considered to be the primary
regulator of the conduct and behavior of Muslims,. every effort
should be made by those Islamic countries seeking to maintain the
integrity of religious law to consider Qur'anic guidance consistent
with its original revolutionary character before imbuing customary
practices with religious significance. Where the Qur'an diverges from
international obligations, the centrality of the Qur'anic prescription,
as well as the importance of the treaty provision to the overall object
and purpose of the treaty, should be relatively weighted.P5
Just as States Parties can take measures to achieve compliance with
the Women's Convention while maintaining the Islamic character of
their laws, so too can the Women's Convention maintain flexibility
where its provisions appear unworkable or undesirable. The Women's
Convention must reflect the diversity of those it represents by
providing for the culturally defined adaptation of it.P The exam-
ples of the coeducation recommendation5 l and the requirement of
freedom to choose a marriage partner" have been discussed in this
regard. States Parties must be accorded a certain amount of
discretion in determining the practicality of implementing particular
provisions in their respective countries. Such determinations must,
however, be reached in conjunction with local women's advocates
familiar with the problems and needs of women at all levels in the
country in question. It is important to note, however, that local
tradition should not be used as an excuse for failure to attempt
compliance.51 ° States Parties should therefore attempt to devise
contextually specific alternatives to those provisions of the Convention
that are culturally anathema. States Parties may also be more
constructive in participating in the process of making the Women's
504. Women's Convention, supra note 1, art. 16(c), at 196.
505. See Looking at Human Rights, supra note 468, at 2 (calling for implementation of
Qur'anic directives in Muslim countries); supra text accompanying note 130 (describing primacy
of Qur'an).
506. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 821-22.
507. See supra Part IV (advocating cultural relativity in implementation of Women's
Convention provisions).
508. See supra notes 465-67 and accompanying text (maintaining that coeducation
recommendation in Article 10(c) of Women's Convention embodied is ill-suited to objective of
gender equality in certain contexts).
509. See supra notes 439-45 and accompanying text (showing that consent is essential feature
of Islamic concept of marriage).
510. See Bayefsky, supra note 2, at 34 (maintaining that traditional outlooks should not be
used as justification for inequity).
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Convention more responsive to pluralistic concerns by requesting that
certain Articles be revised to reflect these concerns as provided for in
Article 26, rather than merely registering reservations.
11
Where States Parties, such as Tunisia, have entered reservations
based on provisions of domestic law, 12 such reservations should be
withdrawn, based on international norms.518 If necessary, reserva-
tions should be reformulated in narrow terms consistent with the
recommendations outlined. In the Islamic context, this involves
separating issues involving Qur'anic prescription, such as matters of
inheritance, 14 from mere tolerance of certain practices, such as
polygamy.
15
Domestic activists have a very important role in achieving compli-
ance with the Women's Convention. First, they must generate
awareness of the Women's Convention.5 16  Second, they must
discourage States Parties from using religious prescription as an
excuse for failing to accede to provisions of the Women's Convention
where such practices are religiously not required.517 Finally, because
social agitation campaigns have had a profound impact on the
development of Islamic law in various countries,5 18 women's rights
advocates and supporters must be prepared to be active in their
demand for women's progress, whether this activism takes the form
of mobilizing support for the Women's Convention, exercising the
vote, and urging others to do so, or running for office. There is
strong evidence of the responsiveness of regimes to public opin-
ion. 19 Domestic support can thus play a major part in paving the
511. SeeWomen's Convention, supra note 1, art. 26, at 197 (providing that States Party may
request revision of Convention in writing and submit this request to U.N. Secretary-General who
will take matter up with General Assembly); see also supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text
(outlining process of requesting revision of Women's Convention).
512. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining that Tunisian reservations to
Article 16 are based on Tunisia's Personal Status Code).
513. See Vienna Declaration, supra note 108, 21 I.L.M. at 1673 (asserting that States Parties
should not be allowed to choose own laws in favor of international norms without justifiable
reasons).
514. The Qur'an 4:11, 4:12 (providing that inheritance shall be proportional to duties of
beneficiary).
515. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 110-11 (suggesting that polygamy is not favored by
Qur'an but merely permitted).
516. Shakuntala, CEDAW Ony A Convention?, EXPRESS INDIA (Washington, D.C.), Sept. 23,
1994, at 2 ("The sad fact" is that few people even know Convention exists).
517. One example of a practice in conflict with the Women's Convention, but not required
by Qur'anic prescription, is the practice of polygamy. See EsPosrro, supra note 120, at 110-11
(noting that some scholars consider Qur'an to advocate ideal of monogamy).
518. See supra Parts M.C-D (observing impact of public and international opinion on
development of law in Egypt and Pakistan).
519. See supra Parts IU.GD (discussing instances in several countries where public opinion
has affected government's position).
2010
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way for the fullest possible implementation of the Women's Conven-
tion.
CONCLUSION
The Islamic Shar i'a is not anathema to those provisions of the
Women's Convention that have been challenged by certain reserving
countries. Islamic countries entering overbroad substantive reserva-
tions to provisions of the Women's Convention on the grounds of
religion only serve to perpetuate the stereotype that Islam institution-
ally subjugates women. Islam's revolutionary effect on the status of
women subsequent to its revelation attests to its original progressive
nature 20 This quality has been overshadowed by corrupt applica-
tion of Islamic principles and incorrect interpretation of Islamic
precepts for political expediency and social entrenchment.
In order to minimize the conflict articulated by various countries
between provisions of the Women's Convention and the personal law
aspects of the Islamic Shari'a, Qur'anic guidance may provide one
means of separating authentically religious dictates from practices that
are merely tolerated. While reserving countries should take steps to
effectuate greater compliance, the Women's Convention itself should
be divested of any culturally insensitive or unworkable language.
Ultimately, its aim and purpose should be to afford women choices
and not to force women into lifestyles that they consider disagreeable.
520. See Esposrro, supra note 120, at 13 (noting that where Quranic reforms were actually
incorporated, status of women was raised from existing conditions in pre-Islamic time period).
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APPENDIX I
GLOSSARY OF COMMONLY USED ISLAMIC TERMS
hadith record of the Sunna or traditions and life exam-
ple of the Prophet Muhammad
Hanafi school of law founded by Islamic leader Abu
Hanifa in eighth century A.D., one feature of
which is its conservative divorce provisions
Hanbali school of law founded by Islamic leader Ahmad
ibn Hanbal in eighth century A.D., one feature of
which permits women to determine select provi-
sions of their marriage contracts, thereby enabling
them to stipulate consequences should their
husbands enter into polygamous unions
hudood Qur'anic penalties
ijma consensus of religious leaders
ijtihad interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna that
was effectively inactivated as a method for deriv-
ing Islamic guidance in tenth century A.D.
Imam Muslim spiritual leader
Maliki school of law founded by Islamic leader Malik ibn
Anas in eighth century A.D. and known for its
relatively progressive divorce provisions
naskh process of repeal or abrogation of those Qur'an
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qiyas process of analogical reasoning that allowed
Qur'anic guidance related to one situation to be
applied to another situation for which Qur'anic
guidance does not exist
Qur'an primary material source of the word of God as re-
vealed to the Prophet and most revered source of
Islamic guidance
Shafi'i school of law founded by Islamic leader Muham-
mad al-Shafi'i during the late eighth and early
ninth centuries A.D.
Shari'a Islamic law as drawn from the Qur'an, the Sunna,
qiyas, and gjma
Shi'a minority branch of Islam that split from majority
Sunni branch beginning in A.D. 632 after dispute
over leadership of Islamic community
siyassa shari'a administrative discretion of ruler to adopt mea-
sures that promote the Shari'a
Sunna life example and traditions of Prophet Muham-
mad
Sunni majority branch of Islam to which about 90% of
Muslims adhere
sura chapter of the Qur'an
takhayur process by which a Muslim could adopt the rule
of a different school of law
taifq patching together provisions of different schools
of law to result in composite law
tazir punishments enforced at the discretion of rulers
and their agents to reform and discipline citizens
in accordance with the Shari'a
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Ummayad period from A.D. 661 - A.D. 750 during which
judges were accused of inadequately enforcing
and implementing the spirit of the Qur'an as a
result of which arose the different schools of law
(Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i)
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APPENDIX I"E
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
The States Parties to the present Convention,
Noting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person and in the equal rights of men and women,
Noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the
principle of the inadmissibility of discrimination and proclaims that
all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
therein, without distinction of any kind, including distinction based
on sex,
Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on
Human Rights have the obligation to ensure the equal right of men
and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political
rights,
Considefing the international conventions concluded under the
auspices of the United Nations and the specialized agencies promot-
ing equality of rights of men and women,
Noting also the resolutions, declarations and recommendations
adopted by the United Nations and the specialized agencies promot-
ing equality of rights of men and women,
Concerned, however, that despite these various instruments extensive
discrimination against women continues to exist,
Recalling that discrimination against women violates the principles
of equality of rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to
the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in the political,
social, economic and cultural life of their countries, hampers the
growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes more
difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the
service of their countries and of humanity,
Concerned that in situations of poverty women have the least access
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to food, health, education, training and opportunities for employment
and other needs,
Convinced that the establishment of the new international economic
order based on equity and justice will contribute significantly towards
the promotion of equality between men and women,
Emphasizing that the eradication of apartheid, of all forms of racism,
racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign
occupation and domination and interference in the internal affairs of
States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of men and
women,
Affirming that the strengthening of international peace and security,
relaxation of international tension, mutual cooperation among all
States irrespective of their social and economic systems, general and
complete disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament under
strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the
principles ofjustice, equality and mutual benefit in relations among
countries and the realization of the right of peoples under alien and
colonial domination and foreign occupation to self-determination and
independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and
territorial integrity, will promote social progress and development and
as a consequence will contribute to the attainment of full equality
between men and women,
Convinced that the full and complete development of a country, the
welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the maximum
participation of women on equal terms with men in all fields,
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of
the family and to the development of society, so for not fully
recognized, the social significance of maternity and the role of both
parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware
that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for
discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing
of responsibility between men and women and society as a whole,
Aware that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the
role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full
equality between men and women,
Determined to implement the principles set forth in the Declaration
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and, for that
purpose, to adopt the measures required for the elimination of such
discrimination in all its forms and manifestations,
Have agreed on the following:
2016
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PART I
Article 1
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimina-
tion against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose
of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by
women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
Article 2
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its
forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay
a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this
end, undertake:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and
women in their national constitutions or other appropriate
legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through
law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this
principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures,
including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimina-
tion against women;
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on
an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national
tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of
women against any act of discrimination;
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of
discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities
and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation;
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimi-
nation against women by any person, organization or enterprise;
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation,
to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and
practices which constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.
Article 3
States Parties shall take in all fields, in particular in the political,
social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures,
including legislation, to ensure the full development and advance-
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ment of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise
and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a
basis of equality with men.
Article 4
1. Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed
at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not
be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention,
but shall in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of
unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be discontin-
ued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment
have been achieved.
2. Adoption by States Parties of special measures, including those
measures contained in the present Convention, aimed at protecting
maternity shall not be considered discriminatory.
Article 5
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based
on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women;
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper
understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition
of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing
and development of their children, it being understood that the
interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases.
Article 6
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploita-
tion of prostitution of women.
PART I[
Article 7
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the political and public life of the
country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms
with men, the right:
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be
eligible for election to all publicly elected bodies;
(b) To participate in the formulation of government policy
and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and
2018
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perform all public functions at all levels of government;
(c) To participate in non-governmental organizations and
associations concerned with the public and political life of the
country
Article 8
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure to
women, on equal terms with men and without any discrimination,
the opportunity to represent their Governments at the international
level and to participate in the work of international organizations.
Article 9
1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to
acquire, change or retain their nationality. They shall ensure in
particular that neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationali-
ty by the husband during marriage shall automatically change the
nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force upon her the
nationality of the husband.
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with
respect to the nationality of their children.
PART I
Article 10
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal
rights with men in the field of education and in particular to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance,
for access to studies and for the achievement of diplomas in
educational establishments of all categories in rural as well as in
urban areas; this equality shall be ensured in pre-school, general,
technical, professional and higher technical education, as well as in
all types of vocational training;
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations,
teaching staff with qualifications of the some standard and school
premises and equipment of the same quality,
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles
of men and women at all levels and in all forms of education by
encouraging coeducation and other types of education which will
help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of
textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching
methods;
(d) The same opportunities to benefit from scholarships and
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other study grants;
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of
continuing education, including adult and functional literacy
programmes, particularly those aimed at reducing, at the earliest
possible time, any gap in education existing between men and
women;
(f) The reduction of female student drop-out rates and the
organization of programmes for girls and women who have left
school prematurely;
(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports
and physical education;
(h) Access to specific educational information to help to
ensure the health and well-being of families, including information
and advice on family planning.
Article 11
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of employment in order
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same
rights, in particular:
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human
beings;
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities,
including the application of the some criteria for selection in
matters of employment;
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment,
the right to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions
of service and the right to receive vocational training and retrain-
ing, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational training and
recurrent training;
(d) The right to equal renumeration, including benefits, and
to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as
equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of
retirement, unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and
other incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in
working conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of
reproduction.
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the
grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure their effective right
to work, States Parties shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions,
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dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy or of maternity leave and
discrimination in dismissals on the basis of marital status;
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with compara-
ble social benefits without loss of former employment, seniority or
social allowances;
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting
social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with
work responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular
through promoting the establishment and development of a
network of child-care facilities;
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnan-
cy in types of work proved to be harmful to them.
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article
shall be reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and techno-
logical knowledge and shall be revised, repealed or extended as
necessary.
Article 12
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care in order
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to
health care services, including those related to family planning.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of this article,
States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in
connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period,
granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition
during pregnancy and lactation.
Article 13
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in other areas of economic and social
life in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women,
the same rights, in particulan.
(a) The right to family benefits;
(b) The right to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of
financial credit;
(c) The right to participate in recreational activities, sports
and all aspects of cultural life.
Article 14
1. States Parties shall take into account the particular problems
faced by rural women and the significant roles which rural women
play in the economic survival of their families, including their work
in the non-monetized sectors of the economy, and shall take all
appropriate measures to ensure the application of the provisions of
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this Convention to women in rural areas.
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure, on
a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate in and
benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall ensure to
such women the right:
(a) To participate in the elaboration and implementation of
development planning at all levels;
(b) To have access to adequate health care facilities,
including information, counselling and services in family planning;
(c) To benefit directly from social security programmes;
(d) To obtain all types of training and education, formal and
non-formal, including that relating to functional literacy, as well as,
inter alia, the benefit of all community and extension services, in
order to increase their technical proficiency;
(e) To organize self-help groups and cooperatives in order
to obtain equal access to economic opportunities through employ-
ment or self-employment;
(f) To participate in all community activities;
(g) To have access to agricultural credit and loans, market-
ing facilities, appropriate technology and equal treatment in land
and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes;
(h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in




1. States Parties shall accord to women equality with men before
the law.
2. States Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal
capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to
exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women equal
rights to conclude contracts and to administer property and shall
treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals.
3. States Parties agree that all contracts and all other private
instruments of any kind with a legal effect which is directed at
restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and
void.
4. States Parties shall accord to men and women the same rights
with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the
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freedom to choose their residence and domicile.
Article 16
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter
into marriage only with their free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and
at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespec-
tive of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in
all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these
rights;
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or
similar institutions where these concepts exist in national legisla-
tion; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including
the right to choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the
ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment
and disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a
valuable consideration.
2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal
effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken
to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration
of marriages in an official registry compulsory.
PART V
Article 17
1. For the purpose of considering the progress made in the
implementation of the present Convention, there shall be estab-
lished a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) consisting, at
the time of entry into force of the Convention, of eighteen and,
after ratification of or accession to the Convention by the thirty-fifth
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State Party, of twenty-three experts of high moral standing and
competence in the field covered by the Convention. The experts
shall be elected by States Parties from among their nationals and
shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration being given to
equitable geographical distribution and to the representation of the
different forms of civilization as well as the principle legal systems.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret
ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each
State Party may nominate one person from among its own
nationals.
3. The initial election shall be held six months after the date of
the entry into force of the present Convention. At least three
months before the date of each election the Secretary-General of
the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties
inviting them to submit their nominations within two months. The
Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all
persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have
nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.
4. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at a
meeting of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General at
United Nations Headquarters. At that meeting, for which two
thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons
elected to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain the
largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the
representatives of States Parties present and voting.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of
four years. However, the terms of nine of the members elected at
the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately
after the first election the names of these nine members shall be
chosen by lot by the Chairman of the Committee.
6. The election of the five additional members of the Committee
shall be held in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3,
and 4 of this article, following the thirty-fifth ratification or
accession. The terms of two of the additional members elected on
this occasion shall expire at the end of two years, the names of
these two members having been chosen by lot by the Chairman of
the Committee.
7. For the filling of casual vacancies, the State Party whose expert
has ceased to function as a member of the Committee shall appoint
another expert from among its nationals, subject to the approval of
the Committee.
8. The members of the Committee shall, with the approval of the
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General Assembly, receive emoluments from United Nations
resources on such terms and conditions as the Assembly may
decide, having regard to the importance of the Committee's
responsibilities.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the
necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the
functions of the Committee under the present Convention.
Article 18
1. States Parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, for consideration by the Committee, a report
on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which
they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the present
Convention and on the progress made in this respect:
(a) Within a year after the entry into force for the State
concerned; and
(b) Thereafter at least every four years and further whenever
the Committee so requests.
2. Reports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the
degree of fulfillment of obligations under the present Convention.
Article 19
1. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
2. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years.
Article 20
1. The Committee shall normally meet for a period of not more
than two weeks annually in order to consider the reports submitted
in accordance with article 18 of the present Convention.
2. The meetings of the Committee shall normally be held at
United Nations Headquarters or at any other convenient place as
determined by the Committee.
Article 21
1. The Committee shall, through the Economic and Social
Council, report annually to the General Assembly of the United
Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and general
recommendations based on the examination of reports and infor-
mation received from the States Parties. Such suggestions and
general recommendations shall be included in the report of the
Committee together with comments, if any, from States Parties.
2. The Secretary-General shall transmit the reports of the Commit-
tee to the Commission on the Status of Women for its information.
Article 22
The specialized agencies shall be entitled to be represented at the
consideration of the implementation of such provisions of the
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present Convention as fall within the scope of their activities. The
Committee may invite the specialized agencies to submit reports on
the implementation of the Convention in areas falling within the
scope of their activities.
PART VI
Article 23
Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provisions that are more
conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women
which may be contained:
(a) In the legislation of a State Party; or
(b) In any other international convention, treaty or agree-
ment in force for that State.
Article 24
States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights
recognized in the present Convention.
Article 25
1. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all
States.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is designated as
the depositary of the present Convention.
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments
of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
4. The present Convention shall be open to accession by all
States. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument
of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 26
1. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be
made at any time by any State Party by means of a notification in
writing addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon
the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.
Article 27
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth
day after the date of deposit with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the twentieth instrument of ratification or
accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Convention or acceding to
it after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or
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accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or
accession.
Article 28
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall receive and
circulate to all States the text of reservations made by States at the
time of ratification or accession.
2. A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the
present Convention shall not be permitted.
3. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time by notification to
this effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, who shall then inform all States thereof. Such notification
shall take effect on the date on which it is received.
Article 29
1. Any dispute between avo or more States Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the present Convention which is
not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the
request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the
organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in
conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State Party may at the time of signature or ratification of
this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not
consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this article. The other
States Parties shall not be bound by that paragraph with respect to
any State Party which has made such a reservation.
3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance
with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw that
reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 30
The present Convention, the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

